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This dissertation puts forth a series of arguments about the extent to which human 
cooperative interaction is fundamentally shaped by mindreading; i.e. the capability to 
reason about the psychological causes (e.g. intentions, beliefs, goals) of behavior.  
The introduction to this dissertation discusses the broad philosophical 
underpinnings that lay the foundations for more specific philosophical issues under 
discussion in subsequent chapters.  
In chapter two, I argue that a thorough interpretation of the relevant empirical 
evidence suggests that mindreading is fast, effortlessly deployed, and operative sub-
personally. For this reason, mindreading is principally well-suited to enable most 
everyday cooperative interactions. In the appendix, I (in collaboration with Evan 
Westra1) elaborate on this picture, arguing that the cognitive mechanisms operative in 
                                                 
1 Equal contribution by both authors. 
  
social interactions are, in all relevant respects, similar to those operative in non-
interactive situations.  
While chapter two and the appendix defend the idea that the cognitive faculties 
responsible for mindreading are fit to enable cooperative interactions, chapters three 
and four take this perspective for granted and discusses whether human cooperation is 
crucially dependent on a form of reciprocal attribution of mental states that is often 
labeled common knowledge.  
In chapter three of this dissertation I address, and reject, the oft defended idea that 
truly performing an action together with others requires that all parties commonly 
know their intended goals. I argue that this view is fundamentally mistaken. 
Successfully acting together with others often requires not knowing these goals.  
Chapter four explores reciprocal belief attribution in the context of coordination 
problems. Humans often coordinate their actions by replicating successful past 
choices; they reason based on precedent. Philosophers have often claimed that 
solving coordination problems by relying on precedent presupposes common 
knowledge that all parties rely on precedent in trying to coordinate their actions. 
Chapter four points out that this assumption is erroneous: Coordinating behavior on 
the basis of precedent is broadly incompatible with any higher-order knowledge (or 
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Chapter 1: Foundations and Motivations 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation is comprised of three core chapters and one appendix. All but 
chapter four have published in journals.2 Each chapter discusses one aspect of the 
importance of mindreading – i.e. the capacity to reason about the mental states of 
other agents3 for the purposes of predicting and interpreting behavior – in cooperative 
contexts. In chapter two, I argue that mindreading is regularly and pervasively 
deployed when interacting with others. In this sense, as I, in collaboration with Evan 
Westra4, demonstrate in the appendix, there is no special problem of mindreading in 
the context of social interaction; most cognitive systems designed for mindreading 
work the same in interactive as well as non-interactive contexts. Chapters three and 
four turn to the importance of common knowledge – a type of reciprocal mental state 
attribution – in two cooperative contexts: coordination games and joint action. In both 
chapters, I conclude that the importance common knowledge has been thought to play 
in these contexts has been overstated in prior philosophical work. Successful 
coordination and joint action do not, at least not always, require all party’s intentions 
to be commonly known between them.  
                                                 
2 Chapter two: Schönherr, J. (2017). What’s so Special About Interaction in Social Cognition?. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 8(2), 181-198. 
Chapter three: Schönherr, J. (2018). Lucky joint action. Philosophical Psychology, 32:1, 123-142.  
Appendix: Schönherr, J., and Westra, E. (2019). Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social Effects on Social 
Cognition. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(1), 27-52. 
3 Arguably, mindreading can also be turned onto the self to interpret one’s own mental states. For the purposes of this 
dissertation we can ignore this possibility.  




The four parts of this dissertation are independent of one another and can be read 
in any order. However, these chapters share a common approach, and can be read as 
part of a broader project. This project starts with the conviction that cooperation is an 
essential feature of human life and that the skilled deployment of mindreading is 
crucial for enabling and sustaining successful cooperation. However, provided that 
mindreading is fundamentally involved in solving a range of cooperative tasks, this 
dissertation contributes to an exploration of the precise extent to which mindreading 
is required to satisfy this function. 
2. Rescuing Tommy’s cat 
Rescue Mission. “Tommy’s cat Cuddles escaped a minute ago. I just 
saw her in the backyard. I’m sure she’s still close by. Would you 
help me find her?”, says Ian. Mia, who’s quite fond cats, agrees; 
“yes, of course! What does she look like?”. “She’s ginger, but the 
tips of her ears are white; quite cute, you’ll see”, says Ian. And off 
they go to capture the cat. As they round the corner, Ian sees a ginger 
cat with white ear tips; only that it is clearly not Cuddles. He turns to 
Mia and notes “Oh, that’s Loge, not Cuddles, Let’s keep looking”. 
They turn around and see Cuddles sitting on the sidewalk in front of 
Ian’s house calmly chewing on the remains of a mouse. Ian looks at 
Mia and then veers off in the direction of his front door. He opens 
the door and then nods in the direction of Mia who now tiptoes 




sudden eruption, steams off into the house. Success! – the cat is back 
in the house.  
Although this vignette does not explicitly state that Ian and Mia attribute mental 
states to one another, a discussion of the psychological processes operative in their 
rescue mission will, almost inevitably, make reference to such mental state 
attribution. Mia’s curt answer “yes, of course” indicates to Ian that she wants to help 
and that she will, thereafter, try to find the cat with him. Furthermore, the reason why 
Ian tells Mia, upon seeing the first cat, that it is Loge, not Cuddles, seems readily 
explained by him noticing that Mia falsely believes that it is Cuddles she is looking at. 
When Ian veers off to open his front door, he counts on Mia to understand his plan; 
his intention for the both of them, that is. A final, admittedly controversial, feature of 
their rescue mission may be that they both not only know that they are looking for the 
cat, but also that they both know that they both know that they are looking for the cat, 
that they both know that they both know that they both know this, and so on ad inf. 
In this dissertation, I will answer three specific questions about the nature of 
mindreading in cooperative contexts akin to ‘Rescue Mission’. I will argue that 
mindreading-involving accounts of such cooperative interactions are basically right 
(chapter 2, appendix), but I will also point to some of the limits of these accounts. 
Extensive iterative knowledge of each cooperator’s intentions (e.g. that they both 





 Before delving into the thick of things, addressing these specific questions, let me 
use this introduction to give an aerial depiction of theories and assumptions relevant 
to my discussion in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. Let’s proceed as follows: 
In section 3, I will canvass an important line of research according to which the 
extensive use of mindreading for cooperative purposes is one fundamental keystone 
in the evolution of distinctively human culture. In section 4., I will turn to reciprocal 
attributions of mental states and explain why philosophers have traditionally thought 
that various forms of cooperation (e.g. joint action, coordination, convention) must 
involve a particular form of reciprocal attribution of mental states often referred to as 
‘common knowledge’. 
3. Mindreading, cooperation, and human evolution 
 “Humans”, Joseph Henrich contends, are “a puzzling primate” (Henrich 2016, vii). 
On the one hand, human life is impressively different from the life of other primates. 
Humans, for instance, live in more environments than any other terrestrial mammal, 
use more complex technologies, live in intricate social arrangements, and follow a 
range of moral and social norms (Henrich 2016, ix). But while illustrating human 
distinctness by pointing to impressive achievements rooted in cooperative culture is 
straight-forward, identifying the cognitive capacities responsible for these human-
specific achievements is less obvious; and it is even less obvious which among all 
relevant capacities are the fundamental ones.  
In this introduction, I cannot, of course, hope to provide a comprehensive survey 




may help understand the cognitive basis for distinctively human social life. Rather, I 
will describe, in reasonable detail, an emerging consensus that it is the human 
expertise and motivation to use mindreading for cooperative purposes that lays a 
partial, but important, foundation for human-specific cooperative life. Talk of a 
“foundation” is meant to indicate an evolutionary perspective. The cooperative use of 
mindreading is what set human sociality apart from the lives of other primates in the 
ancestral environment. There are several arguments to support this conjecture.  
First, in a direct experimental comparison between cognitive capacities of children 
and chimpanzees, children’s far outstrip chimpanzees’ capacities only along social 
cognitive dimension. Second, there is little evidence that apes are motivated to use 
their constrained capacity for mindreading for cooperative purposes. Thirdly, this is 
true even in the case of cooperative hunting, arguably the most plausible contender 
case for mindreading-enabled chimpanzee cooperation. Let me delineate each line of 
argument in turn.   
In a series of experiments, Herrmann et al. (2007, 2010) subjected preschool 
children and chimpanzees to a battery of experiments, testing each group’s general 
intelligence, spatial, and social cognitive capacities. In these experiments, humans 
and primates, had to track moving objects, discriminate quantities of objects, engage 
in causal reasoning about hidden rewards, interpret communicative clues about a 
reward’s location, follow an actor’s gaze, emulate an actor in solving a task. Hermann 
and colleagues found that primates and humans differed significantly only along the 




differences are a matter of degree; although, in these experiments, primates were able 
to learn from others and follow others’ gaze, the difference between primates and 
children was pronounced.  
Now, being able to follow gaze, or learn from others does not, by itself, 
demonstrate an understanding of mental states; i.e. being able to follow someone’s 
gaze does not imply understanding that others attend to things; and being able to learn 
from others does not imply an understanding that others intend to demonstrate 
something. However, many (e.g. Hare et al. 2001, 2006; Melis et al. 2006; 
Buttelmann et al. 2007; Call and Tomasello 2008; Kaminski et al. 2008) believe, on 
independent grounds, that primates and other animals are capable of understanding a 
range of mental states (e.g. know what others know, perceive, intend).5 It is, thus, a 
reasonable conjecture that these performance differences in social cognitive tasks are 
explained, at least in part, by differences in an underlying social cognitive capacity to 
attribute mental states to others. 
While the difference between humans and primates with regard to their 
understanding of mental states such as seeing, knowing, and intending is a matter of 
degree, the differences with regard to their understanding of belief may turn out to be 
categorical. Neurotypical humans, on the one hand, seem to attribute beliefs6 to 
others with ease and early on. This much is uncontroversial. Controversies revolve 
                                                 
5 For a dissenting voice, please consult Penn and Povinelli (2013) who nevertheless concede that “most would probably agree 
[…] that nonhuman animals ‘understand some psychological states in others – the only question is which ones and to what 
extent’” (Penn and Povinelli 2013, 62f). 
6 Belief understanding is typically measured in terms understanding false belief. As philosophers (Dennett 1978; Premack and 
Woodruff 1978) have pointed out, in order to show that an individual possesses the concept ‘belief’ one must show that this 




around the precise developmental trajectory of such understanding. Until the early 
2000s, there was a broad consensus that children start understanding beliefs at around 
age 4 (Wellman et al. 2001). However, more recent research, initiated by Onishi et 
al.’s (2005) seminal study7, uses non-verbal measures (e.g. looking time, active 
helping) and finds evidence for belief understanding in infants between 6 and 36 
months (e.g. Wang and Leslie 2016; Senju et. al. 2011, Kovács et al. 2010; Onishi 
and Baillargeon 2005; Southgate et al. 2010; Southgate and Vernetti 2014). Now, 
while there are over “30 reports spanning 11 different methods, providing convergent 
evidence for false-belief understanding in children ages 6–36 months” (Baillargeon et 
al. 2018), some of these findings could not be replicated (e.g. Southgate et al. 2007), 
some have been replicated successfully (e.g. Wang and Leslie 2016; Senju et. al. 
2011), and many experiments have simply not been attempted to be replicated. For a 
detailed discussion of these replications problems consult Baillargeon et al. (2018) 
who hypothesize that “procedural differences between studies may explain failures to 
replicate” (Baillargeon et al. 2018, 112).  
Alternative interpretations of experimental results from implicit false belief tasks, 
however, have been offered. Butterfill and Apperly (2009, 2013) distinguish between 
two distinct cognitive capacities: on the one hand, a capacity to understand beliefs “as 
such” (Butterfill and Apperly 2013,607); on the other hand, a cognitively limited 
capacity “track” others’ beliefs (Butterfill and Apperly 2013). Non-verbal false-belief 
tasks, it is argued, provide evidence for the latter, but not the former, capacity 
                                                 
7 In this study, Onishi et al. used a looking time paradigm to show that 15 months olds predict an actor’s behavior taking into 




(Butterfill and Apperly 2013, 620). Heyes (e.g. 2014) argues that infants’ 
performance in non-verbal false belief tasks can be explained by “low level 
novelt[ies]” (Heyes 2014, 647) (e.g. the relative novelty of a green, as opposed to red, 
boxes). The best experimental evidence, Heyes contends, is compatible with both, 
cognitively rich and sparse, interpretations.  
Non-human animals, on the other hand, mostly fail to demonstrate belief 
understanding (e.g. Kaminski et al. 2008; Krachun et al. 2009, Call and Tomasello 
2008). Challenging this consensus, two recent studies (Krupenye et al. 2016; 
Buttelmann et al. 2017) find evidence that great apes distinguish true from false 
beliefs in a looking time paradigm (Krupenye et al. 2016) and an interactive helping 
task (Buttelmann et al. 2017). More research is required to reach a conclusive verdict 
on belief understanding in non-human animals.  
Let’s turn to the second of the above-mentioned arguments. Evidence suggests 
that, in the context of cooperative interaction, primates make very limited use of their 
capacity engage in mindreading. The default case for this claim comes from 
experimental research indicating that great apes perform poorly in cooperative tasks 
(e.g. Melis et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Hamann et al. 2011, Hare and Tomasello 
2004). In each of these studies it is argued that, although apes do cooperate, their 
motivation is highly limited. For instance, Melis et al. (2006) found that chimpanzee 
cooperation breaks down when subsequent rewards require food sharing. 
Chimpanzees cooperate more when the rewards are presented in separate piles, one 




found that, while chimpanzees do, at times, make food available to others, such food 
sharing does not correlate with prior collaboration on a task. Lastly, Hare and 
Tomasello (2004) found evidence across a range of experiments that chimpanzees 
perform better in competitive as opposed to cooperative settings. All this leads to the 
assessment that great apes have a “Machiavellian intelligence. […] [G]reat ape social 
cognition seems built for outcompeting others by outsmarting them” (Tomasello 
2016, 22). 
Humans, on the other hand, show strong prosocial tendencies early on and are 
highly motivated to use their cognitive capacities to facilitate cooperation. 
Buttelmann et al. (2009) found that children actively help an adult taking into account 
the adult’s false beliefs. Children between 9 and 15 months expect others to help 
those in need (Köster et al. 2016) and they avoid agents with harmful intentions 
(Vondervoort et al. 2017). In the context of mutualistic cooperative activities, three-
year-olds share the rewards of their collaboration equitably, even when the chance to 
selfishly monopolize rewards is available (Warneken et al. 2011). Twelve-month old 
children will spontaneously provide helpful information to a partner by pointing to a 
desired object (Liszkowski et al. 2006). This is but a snapshot of the existing 
literature on infant cooperation, but it shall suffice to demonstrate that, while 
chimpanzees and other great apes use their mindreading skills mostly in competitive 
contexts, humans collaborate freely, effortlessly, and early on. 
Now, although this experimental research suggests that great apes use their 




readily explained by the artificial experimental set-up of the relevant experiments. For 
this reason, some argue, these experiments fail to generate viable hypotheses about 
cognitive capacities in non-human animals. More ecologically valid research is 
required to justify such conclusions. More particularly, in a series of studies, Boesch 
and colleagues (e.g. Boesch 1994; Boesch and Boesch-Achermann 2000) have argued 
that chimpanzee hunts of monkeys in the Tai forest are deeply cooperative and 
mentalistic. Allegedly, proper theorizing about these hunts shows that chimpanzees 
are capable of understanding shared goals and complex social roles in a cooperative 
task.   
Over the years, this rich cognitive characterization has been subjected to extensive 
criticism. First, and most importantly, this interpretation is simply at odds with the 
experimental findings summarized above. Secondly, alternative, less complex, but 
experimentally substantiated explanations have been offered. Tomasello et al. (2005, 
2011) proposes that, in those hunts, a single chimpanzee begins the hunt on its own. 
Subsequently, others occupy the “most opportune spatial position still available at any 
given moment in the emerging hunt” (Tomasello 2011, 8). Importantly, according to 
this interpretation, each individual simply tries to maximize their personal expected 
payoff not representing the hunt either as a collaborative effort, nor understanding the 
hunt as an enterprise that requires specific roles to be filled. This interpretation is 
experimentally bolstered by Bullinger et al. (2011) who find that chimpanzees will 




Summarizing this discussion, there is a long line of experimental research 
investigating both humans’ and non-humans’ capability and motivation to use 
mindreading in cooperative contexts. Overall, this research suggests that humans, 
even in infancy, are highly motivated and skilled to use mindreading in an effort to 
cooperate with others. Non-human animals’ skill and motivation to use mindreading 
to cooperate, on the other hand, is highly limited.  
Over the past 15 years, some philosophers and psychologists – commonly labeled 
“enactivists” – have challenged the idea that cooperative interactions such as hunting, 
walking together, or baking a cake together need to be explained and sustained 
through the exercise of mindreading. Mindreading, the worry has it, is a slow and 
effortful, mental process. For this reason, mindreading could not possibly be the 
cognitive basis for fast, online cooperative interactions such as group hunts. In 
chapter two of this dissertation, I will argue that enactivists are simply wrong about 
this: Mindreading is often fast, spontaneous and does not always require cognitive 
effort. In the appendix, I, in collaboration with Evan Westra, elaborate on this picture, 
arguing that the same cognitive mechanisms are operative in interactive as well as 
non-interactive (e.g. observational) situations.  
4. Cooperation and common knowledge 
Knowing what others want, know, believe and feel can benefit one’s attempts to 
cooperate with others; this is, of course, a truism. The goal of the previous section 
was to show just how fundamental mindreading might be for human cooperation. In 




In the present section, we will expand our discussion and focus on the role of 
reciprocal mindreading (i.e. common knowledge) for cooperative interaction. 
Broadly sticking to our hunting paradigm, let’s start with an intuitive vignette to 
introduce the idea of reciprocal mindreading:  
Failed Hunt. You and I are hunters and we are given the opportunity to hunt a 
large stag, too nimble and fierce to hunt individually. Any attempt to hunt 
down the stag single-handedly would in fact be quite dangerous. Together, 
however, we stand a good chance of success. Initially, we both think that 
we each endorse this plan. Suppose however that, for some reason or other, 
you think that I think that you have decided not to play your part. In this 
case, you are led to believe that I won’t play my part; after all, you know 
that I don’t want to be the sole hunter. For this reason, you predict that 
you’d be by yourself hunting this game. As a result, you decide not to 
participate which makes me the sole hunter. The hunt fails. The stag 
escapes. 
In situations such as this one (standardly labeled “Stag hunt”8), false higher-order 
beliefs (beliefs about what the other hunter believes) can stifle our cooperative 
                                                 
8 To be more precise, ‘stag hunt’ refers to a game with two Nash equilibria; one strict equilibrium, and one non-strict 
equilibrium. Such games can be represented by the following payoff matrix:  
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efforts. Other times, reciprocal expectations help stabilize our cooperative endeavors. 
To see this, consider another example:  
Successful Hunt. As before, you and I are hunters and we are given the 
opportunity to hunt a large stag, too nimble and fierce to hunt individually. 
Any attempt to hunt down the stag single handedly would in fact be quite 
dangerous. Together, however, we stand a good chance of success. If any 
of us gave up their intention to participate in the hunt this could potentially 
introduce danger to the lonely hunter who’s left behind. Initially, let’s 
assume, I am uncertain about whether or not you will participate in the 
hunt. Suppose, however, that I later learn that you believe that I will 
participate in the hunt, which is why it is reasonable for me to suppose that 
you won’t bail. Given this belief, I, in turn, am motivated to participate.  
My initial doubts about you playing your part are dispersed by my thinking that you 
think that I will cooperate; i.e. these beliefs have assured me that you won’t bail.  
The idea that the presence (or absence) of these reciprocal beliefs can support (or 
impede) successful cooperation has played a crucial role in a range of theories; 
empirical, game theoretic, and conceptual. I will introduce each of these theories; but 
let me first give a little more general characterization of reciprocal mindreading in 
terms of common knowledge.  
                                                 
“X” indicates the cooperative move. “Y” indicates that defection. These games are called trust games, simply because the only 




In the above examples, ‘Failed Hunt’ and ‘Successful Hunt’, we’ve made explicit 
how second-order mental state attribution can be relevant to cooperation. We can, 
however, construct similar arguments for third-order, forth-order, and ultimately nth-
order beliefs. Consider a slightly amended version of ‘Failed Hunt’ containing a 
third-order belief: Suppose I believe that you think that I think that you won’t 
participate in the hunt. In this case, I will be led to believe that you think that I won’t 
participate, which, in turn, rationalizes my prediction that you won’t participate. For 
this reason, given this belief, I ought not to participate. Such arguments, it is easy to 
see, seem to generalize to nth level beliefs which is why successful cooperation, at 
least in scenarios akin to our hunting vignettes, seem to require an infinite cascade of 
higher-level beliefs about the all participants’ strategy choices; at least this seems 
tempting to say. This phenomenon has been labeled common knowledge. To cut a 
long story short, a proposition is common knowledge between a group of agents “just 
in case they all know it, they all know that they all know it, they all know that they all 
know that they all know it, and so on” (Lederman 2017, 2); and it is this kind of 
knowledge that seems to play an enabling role for typical cases of cooperative 
interaction such as the ones introduces above.  
Now, characterizing common knowledge in terms of such infinitely nested beliefs 
is really just that; – a characterization, not a definition. Common knowledge merely 
entails such nested knowledge; this is not to say that this nested structure constitutes 
common knowledge.9 To see the distinction between constitution and entailment, 
                                                 
9  E.g. Harman (1977), Heal (1978); Milgrom (1981); Clark and Marshall (1981); Mertens and Zamir (1985); Barwise (1988); 
Lismont and Mongin (2003) give alternative definitions of common knowledge in terms of the publicity of an event, recursive 




consider David Lewis’ work (see Cubitt and Sugden 2003, 185; Lewis 1969) who 
famously argued that common knowledge is defined in terms of symmetrically 
positioned reasoning on the part of various agents. Such symmetry is then said to 
entail nested knowledge.  
This much shall suffice to introduce the idea of common knowledge. Above, I 
indicated that the idea of reciprocal mindreading (i.e. common knowledge) has been 
applied to empirical, conceptual, as well as game theoretic questions related to 
cooperation. In what follows, I will provide a brief survey of these applications. Let’s 
start with empirical applications.  
In the previous section, I reviewed a range of empirical findings pointing to the 
idea that humans’ use of mindreading in cooperative situations is at least one 
fundamental ingredient in specifically human cultural evolution. Beyond what was 
said above, Tomasello (2005, 2011) hypothesizes that human cooperation is distinct 
from great ape cooperation in that humans can form joint goals which are defined in 
terms of reciprocal mindreading: “For you and me to form a joint goal (or joint 
intention) to pursue a stag together, (1) I must have the goal to capture the stag 
together with you; (2) you must have the goal to capture the stag together with me; 
and , crucially, (3) we must have mutual knowledge, or common ground, that we both 
know each other’s goal” (Tomasello 2011, 36).  
Others have elaborated on this idea arguing that joint attention similarly requires 
such a “common ground” (e.g. Moll and Meltzoff 2011). While researchers such as 




mindreading in describing human cooperation, they have not provided a more 
thoroughgoing analysis of this phenomenon. Let’s, therefore, move on to appeals to 
common knowledge in game theoretic models of cooperation.  
Game theorists have traditionally been interested in the notion of common 
knowledge, in part because strategic solutions (i.e. solutions that are not based on 
luck) to various cooperatives games seem to require common knowledge of each 
player’s strategy choice. Let me illustrate this idea with the following depiction of the 
famous “coordinated attack” vignette: 
Coordinated Attack. “Two divisions of an army are camped on separate 
hilltops overlooking a valley. In the valley awaits the enemy. If both 
divisions attack the enemy simultaneously they will win the battle, while if 
only one division attacks it will suffer a catastrophic defeat. Each of the 
generals commanding these hilltop divisions wants to avoid a catastrophic 
defeat: neither of them will attack unless he believes that the general 
commanding the other division will attack with him. During the night a 
thick fog descends over the hilltops; the only way the generals can 
communicate is by sending a messenger through the enemy camp.” 
(Lederman 2018, 921)10 
It can be shown that rational generals, who have common knowledge that they are 
rational, will only attack after infinitely many messages have been exchanged. If we 
then think of each of these messages as a ground for a belief concerning the 
                                                 




respective other’s plan, then the generals will only successfully coordinate their 
efforts given that they commonly know that they plan to attack; i.e. after infinitely 
many messages have been exchanged. Cooperation in these scenarios, it is argued, 
requires common knowledge; “almost common knowledge” (Rubinstein 1989) is 
insufficient to make attacking rational. 
For a range of reasons, many philosophers and game theorists have found these 
conclusions unsatisfying. First, in experimental settings people tend to coordinate 
successfully on the attack strategy after finitely many messages have been sent (e.g. 
Camerer 2003; Kneeland 2012). Others (e.g. Binmore et al. 2001) argue that thought 
experiments such as ‘Coordinated Attack’ fail in important ways to resemble real life 
cooperation problems, which is why such thought experiments also fail to generate 
insights about real-life cooperation. Furthermore, Lederman (2018) argues that even 
ideally rational generals can coordinate their attack after sending finitely many 
messages, provided that their rationality is not common knowledge.  
Recently, however, common knowledge requirements in game theory have been 
subjected to more radical criticism. Lederman (2017) argues that ideal agents can 
never have common knowledge. In chapter four of this dissertation, I add to this more 
radical line of criticism: sometimes cooperation can be achieved by replicating past 
cooperative success – i.e. we can use precedent to coordinate our actions. Precedent-
based solutions, however, are broadly incompatible with any higher-order beliefs 




higher-order beliefs function as powerful epistemic defeaters for precedent-based 
inferences.  
These game-theoretic as well as empirical approaches reviewed above are united 
in highlighting (or questioning) the importance of reciprocal mindreading (e.g. 
common knowledge) for successful cooperation. Philosophers interested in joint 
action and convention, on the other hand, are interested in reciprocal mindreading 
(i.e. common knowledge) for the purpose of explicating what it means to act jointly 
or to follow a convention. Let me address the case of convention first and, thereafter, 
proceed to discussion ‘joint action’.  
The concept of common knowledge has been invoked in defining conventional 
behavior. Driving on the right side of the road is a convention, at least in certain parts 
of the world. What distinguishes such conventional behavior from other, superficially 
similar, ways of acting (e.g. everyone’s driving on the right side simply by 
happenstance)? This question was famously addressed by David Lewis in his 
landmark work Convention (1969). Lewis’ definition of a convention is complex and 
controversial. For some conduct to count as a convention it must, among other things, 
be a behavioral regularity – most people drive on right side –, there have to be viable 
alternatives available – people could be driving on the left –, and all participants (or a 
relevant subset) must expect all others to act in accordance with this regularity.11 
Furthermore, Lewis argues that these conditions must also be commonly known by all 
participants in the convention. If, for instance, everyone were to expect everyone else 
                                                 
11 Both requirements are contentious. Gilbert (1981) argues that de facto compliance is required. Furthermore, Bicchieri (2006, 




to drive on the right side, but also thought that everyone acted this way for merely 
frivolous reasons, then, arguably, we would not want to call this behavior 
conventional. Over the years, many have criticized Lewis’ definition. Burge (1975) 
argues that, although it is true that conventional actions must have alternatives, these 
need not be commonly known. Gilbert (1981) argues that conventions don’t require 
extensive de facto compliance, but, rather, a commitment to comply. Miller (2001) 
argues that not all alternatives must be equally as good. However, despite these 
criticisms, each of these authors has invoked common knowledge in their own 
treatment of conventions. Gilbert, for instance, argues that the relevant commitments 
need to be common knowledge, and Burge merely argues that some (but not all) 
features of a convention (e.g. the fact that conventions require alternatives) need not 
be common knowledge. Thus, although the precise role common knowledge plays in 
defining conventions is controversial, the fact that common knowledge has some role 
to play is not. 
Let’s finally talk about the role common knowledge has been thought to play in 
defining ‘joint action’. This term, philosophers (e.g., Kutz 2000, 5, Miller 2001; 
Gilbert 2003; Bratman 1993, 99) contend, refers to a basic way of acting together that 
is distinguished from mere parallel action. To see the difference between both ways 
of acting, contrast the case of two strangers walking down Fifth Avenue next to one 
another, each intending not to run into the other, with the case of two friends walking 
down Fifth Avenue together. Joint action theory sets out to explicate the 
distinguishing features of such examples. Philosophical orthodoxy has it that one such 




with the respective other person (e.g., Bratman 2013; Miller 2001; Tuomela 2005). 
Thus, one alleged difference between strangers walking next to each other and friends 
walking together is that the friends have common knowledge that they are walking 
together with the respective other friend. In chapter three of this dissertation I argue 
against this requirement. More specifically, I argue that (a) acting jointly does not 
require that the participants commonly know their respective intentions, and, 
furthermore, that (b) acting jointly, at times, depends on the fact that each 
participant’s intentions are not commonly known among them.  
This concludes our introduction. We’ve reviewed a variety of ways – empirical, 
game theoretic, and conceptual – in which mindreading has been invoked to explain 
and define ways in which humans can successfully cooperate. Throughout this 
introduction, we have reviewed theories stressing that mindreading (first order, and 
reciprocal) is fundamental for human cooperation. The individual chapters of this 
dissertation, to which I have alluded at various points in this introduction, serve to 
explore targeted questions about the extent to which mindreading may prove to be 
fundamental in cooperative contexts. The emerging picture is that, while first-order 
mental state attributions are a fundamental, and experimentally demonstratable, part 
of human social life, the role common knowledge has been though to play in defining 








Chapter 2: What’s so Special About Interaction in Social 
Cognition?  
1. Introduction 
For now over 15 years, some researchers in neuroscience, cognitive science, and in 
philosophy have advocated and defended the idea that our ability to successfully 
interact with other agents and our ability to understand other agents when we 
observe them call for different “social cognitive” explanations. However, there is as 
of now no consensus about how best to describe the “social cognitive” rift that 
separates interactive and observational contexts. More particularly, on the one 
hand, researchers disagree about the kinds of cognitive mechanisms (e.g. word 
learning, gaze following, belief-desire attribution, attention allocation) that are 
recruited differentially in both contexts. On the other hand, there has been 
widespread disagreement about the extent to which cognitive mechanisms are 
recruited differentially. In this introductory section, I will give an overview over 
four prominent proposals from the recent literature. Thereafter, I will focus my 
discussion on one particular interpretation according to which interactive and 
observational contexts are categorically distinct with respect to belief-desire 
attribution. 
A number of researchers have construed the interaction–observation divide as a 
matter of degree. Most prominently, Leonard Schilbach and colleagues’ extensive 




relevance of interaction with regard to lower-level social cues such as mutual gaze, 
joint attention and socially relevant facial expressions has shown that there are 
distinct neural activation profiles associated with interactive and observational 
contexts. Firstly, they use interactive eye tracking12 to show that self-directed facial 
expressions lead to “a differential increase of neural activity in the ventral portion 
of medial prefrontal cortex and the (superficial) amygdala, other-directed facial 
expressions resulted in a differential recruitment of medial and lateral parietal 
cortex” (Schilbach et al. 2013A, 400). Thus, self-directed facial expressions are 
associated with “emotional and evaluative processing” (Schilbach et al. 2006, 
2013B). Secondly, when jointly attending to an object the medial prefrontal cortex, 
and the posterior cingulate cortex are differentially activated (Schilbach et al. 
2013B, 402). Thirdly, they find distinct patterns of neural activity associated with 
the different roles agents may have when jointly attending to an object. Following 
someone’s gaze directed at an object differentially recruits the medial prefrontal 
cortex, while leading someone’s gaze recruits the ventral striatum (Schilbach 2015, 
Schilbach et al. 2010, 2702). 
Interpreting these neural data, they suggest that leading gaze may have a 
rewarding effect and may lead to an increase in motivation (Schilbach et al. 2010, 
2013A).13 Along the same lines, they hypothesize that 2nd person interaction is 
marked by heightened emotional engagement (Schilbach et al. 2013A, 396). 
                                                 
12 This method allows to obtain eye tracking data from “participants inside the MR scanner to make a virtual character’s gaze 
behavior responsive to the participant’s gaze in real time” (Schilbach 2014). 
13 Redcay et al. (2013, 435) lends further support to the idea that self-directed gaze in interactions and self-directed gaze from a 




Furthermore, using a stimulus-response compatibility task,14 Schilbach et al. (2011) 
show that gaze shift of an interacting social stimulus influences action control in 
normal functioning subjects, but not in subjects with high-functioning autism. This 
indicates that action control in normal functioning subjects is dependent on 
interactive gaze. 
Notably, on Schilbach’s account, “social cognitive” differences in interactive 
and observational situations are wide-ranging as they bear on attention allocation, 
reward experience, motivation, and action control. It is for these reasons that 
they speak of a “second person mode” of social cognition that is “fundamentally 
different” (Schilbach 2014) from third person social cognition. Nevertheless, the 
differences between these “modes” of social cognition should be understood as a 
matter of degree.  
A second prominent idea concerns the role interaction may play in learning 
processes. Famously, György Gergely and Gergely Csibra argue for a human-
specific learning mechanism which is sensitive to interaction-specific ostensive 
signals (e.g. eye contact, eyebrow raising) (Gergely 2010; Csibra and Gergely 
2006). In these ostensive contexts, according to Csibra and Gergely, the learner is 
biased to interpret communicative gestures as transmitting generic knowledge 
about referential kinds (Csibra and Gergely 2009) (rather than just episodic 
facts). For instance, in one crucial study (Yoon et al. 2008) preverbal infants 
                                                 
14 In this experiment, neurotypical subjects and subjects with high-functioning autism had to produce spatially congruent and 





encode information about an object’s identity in a communicative context 
(involving eye contact, and infant directed speech); and they encode information 
about an object’s location when such a communicative context is absent.15  
However, Csibra and Gergely’s proposal remains controversial when interpreted 
as a claim specifically about interaction. On the one hand, although children’s 
sensitivity to different types of information may depend on a context being 
communicative, it remains to be shown whether it also depends on communication 
in interaction. In Yoon et al.’s experiment (Yoon et al. 2008) a communicative, 
interactive context was contrasted with a non-communicative, non-interactive 
context. Hence, it was not established how infants would have responded had they 
merely observed a communicative context. Secondly, the role of interaction in 
learning might be more complex than Csibra and Gergely’s model predicts. For 
instance, Shimpi et al. (2013) find that imitative learning of novel actions is 
sensitive to toddler-directed ostensive cues only if the interactor is familiar to the 
infant.16  
A third proposal concerning social cognition in interaction comes from Henrike 
Moll and Michael Tomasello (Moll et al. 2011a) who argue that children often 
overestimate the amount of knowledge that is shared between her and the person 
interacted with (Moll et al. 2011a, 256). In their study, two-year-olds first played 
                                                 
15 In this looking time experiment, infants are shown to be more surprised when an object unexpectedly changes its identity 
after an actor had pointed to the object in a communicative context. Furthermore, infants are shown to be more surprised 
when an object unexpectedly changes its location after an agent had grasped the object in a non-communicative context. 
16 In this experiment, 18 month old infants are presented with novel actions (e.g. ringing a doorbell using one’s forehead) after 
a brief warm-up period involving a sorting game. Shimpi found that imitative learning crucially depends on whether the person 





with an adult using two toys. Subsequently, in the “Silent Absence Condition”, the 
adult left the room and stopped the interaction with the child. Then a third toy was 
introduced to the child in the adult’s absence. Then the adult returned. 
Alternatively, in the “Communicative Absence Condition”, the adult left the room 
but kept communicating with the child in her absence from behind a shelf saying 
things such as “Oh, how nice! Great! Super!” (see Moll et al. 2011a, 256). Moll et 
al. found that in the Silent Absence Condition all infants knew that the adult had not 
encountered the third toy which was introduced in the adult’s absence. In contrast, 
in the Communicative Absence Condition children found it significantly harder to 
tell which object was unknown to the adult. In light of this finding, Moll et al. 
hypothesize that, in interactive contexts, young children assume that they share the 
space around them. However, whether this finding points to a cognitive feature 
specific to interactive engagement has yet to be empirically determined by 
introducing more controls in the study. For instance, Moll et al. did not rule out 
whether children would rely on the ‘shared space’ assumption when merely 
observing an interactive situation. 
Notably, these three proposals don’t explicitly address the role of belief-desire 
attribution in interaction and observation. A fourth proposal, the one I will focus on 
in this chapter, has been coined “enactivism”. Enactivists specifically deny that 
most interactions involve the attribution of beliefs and desires to other agents (an 
ability I will call “mindreading”). More specifically, a number of enactivists have 
argued that mindreading should be relegated to the 3rd personal (i.e. observational) 




(i.e. the interactive stance) in contrast is, in some important sense, devoid of 
mindreading. This is not to be understood as a developmental claim alone. 
Allegedly, interactions between adults don’t involve mindreading either. 
Consequently, enactivists have prided themselves on offering an alternative to the 
more traditional belief/desire-based approaches to social cognition, i.e. simulation 
theory (ST)17 and theory theory (TT)18 (In what follows, I will refer to theorists 
who defend one of those theories collectively as “ToMers”). If the enactivist’s 
assessment should turn out to be correct, then ToMers are thoroughly undermined, 
because, of course, they aspire to accurately capture the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying real life interactions (see Carruthers 2009, 167). 
In short, among other things, enactivists have defended the following two 
ideas: 
Core Thesis. Successful interactions are neither driven nor explained by the 
interactors’ ability to mindread. 
Distinctness. The mechanisms enabling 2nd personal social cognition and 
those enabling 3rd personal social cognition are distinct. 
In Section 2, I will clarify what is meant by ‘interaction’. Next (Sections 3 and 4), I 
will examine two enactivist defenses of Core Thesis. The first defense was 
developed by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo who argue that interactions 
                                                 
17 According to simulation theory, attribution of mental states to other agents is achieved using one’s own mental states to 
simulate the mental states of other agents. 





cannot be explained in terms of mindreading, because, quite generally, interactions 
cannot be explained in terms of individual agents’ contributions to interactions. 
Next, in Section 4, I will critically discuss Shaun Gallagher’s and David Hutto’s 
account of Core Thesis. Both argue that lower level cognitive mechanisms not 
involving mindreading suffice to navigate interactions. In Section 5, I will argue 
against Gallagher’s and Hutto’s view concerning Distinctness. 
Before starting my discussion proper I’d like to motivate my skeptical stance 
towards enactivism by discussing two general worries. These worries will cast 
initial doubt on the idea that social cognition in interactive and observational 
contexts is fundamentally distinct. First, in the real world, the boundaries between 
2nd and 3rd personal contexts simply aren’t clear-cut enough in order to merit such 
a sharp theoretical distinction. Suppose, for instance, a child, Johnny, is interacting 
with his brother in order to plot something against their sister, Mary, who plays with 
her toys in the other end of the room. Suppose Johnny now turns to Mary and starts 
interacting with her. The enactivist might say that Johnny first had a purely 
observational attitude towards his sister; thereafter he adopted an interactive 
attitude towards her. But how plausible is this? In the real world, interactions with 
and observations of others are tightly interwoven; so tightly indeed that it would 
seem surprising if distinct theories were to apply to both contexts. Johnny might 
observe his sister for a few seconds, then interact with her for a minute, then turn 
back to his brother observing her again. In the face of such a tightly knit 
juxtaposition of interactive and observational contexts we might generally tame our 




Second, many inferences that can be drawn specifically in interactions can 
likewise be drawn when observing others interact. Let me give an instructive 
example from Stephen Butterfill (see 2013a): He argues that in interactive situations 
involving joint actions, it is especially easy to correctly attribute intentions to the 
other agent; this is true simply because joint action often requires sharing of 
intentions. Suppose I intend to put a stroller on a bus and you help me carry out my 
plan. If our joint action is to be successful you should, by default, also intend to put 
the stroller on the bus. If you, say, intend to flip it over, or take its wheels off we 
won’t succeed in carrying out my plan. Butterfill writes that in these situations 
interactors “may be in a position to know that the goals of her target’s actions will 
be the goals of her own actions” (Butterfill 2013a, 22). Hence, interactions of this 
form make effortless attributions of goals to others possible. However, at the same 
time Butterfill recognizes that observers could also acquire such knowledge. While 
interactors can rely on the “my-goal-is-her-goal” inference, observers could 
respectively rely on the “her-goal-is-his-goal” inference (Butterfill 2013a, 20). Just 
as I am in a position to know your intentions when we are carrying out a joint 
action, so can an onlooker know your intentions when she sees us carrying out a 
joint action (given she knows my intentions). Interactors do not enjoy a principled 
privilege. Therefore, at least in this case, alleged genuinely “interactive” features of 
social interactions can, in principal, be exploited from a third person perspective. 
Of course, if we put a stroller on a bus I will usually be more motivated to know 
what your intentions are. Furthermore, I will pay closer attention to what you are 




is no principled advantage interactors enjoy leaves untouched Schilbach’s claims 
about the role of motivation, attention, and reward feelings in interactions (see 
above).19  
2. Interaction – paradigms without a definition 
ToMers and enactivists disagree about whether normal subjects (need to)20 rely on 
mindreading in order to successfully navigate social interaction. But what are 
interactions? In her article “Embodied cognition and mindreading” (Spaulding 
2010) Shannon Spaulding gives us a concise example of a prototypical interaction: 
Suppose Jack and Jill are sitting in a coffee shop; both are doing some work on 
their respective computers when suddenly Jack starts asking Jill questions such as 
“What are you working on?”, “Where are you from?” etc.. When Jill gives only 
cursory answers such as “philosophy”, Jack responds “Oh, I bet you are really 
deep” to which Jill just responds “sure”. This goes on for a little while but, 
ultimately, when he realizes that Jill won’t reciprocate the way he’d like, Jack lets 
Jill off the hook and they both go about their work. 
If ToMers and enactivists disagree about what enables agents to successfully 
interact, they surely disagree about the kind of situation just described. ToMers will 
most likely analyze this situation along the following lines: Jill believes that Jack 
                                                 
19 Furthermore, research concerning social cognition in high-functioning autism indicates that there is some difference between 
social cognition in interactive and observational contexts. Schilbach et al. (2013) hypothesize that it is specifically social 
cognition in interaction which may be impaired in high-functioning autism. 
20 Recent studies concerning the automaticity of mindreading (e.g. Qureshi et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 2014) seem to 
indicate that others’ mental states may be computed and attributed to others even in situations in which this is not at all 
necessary. Therefore, the claim that mindreading is necessary for social interaction needs to be distinguished from the claim 





believes that she is interested in him. She also believes that Jack’s belief is false, 
because, in fact, she is not interested in him. Jack initially believes (or hopes) that 
Jill has a desire to talk to him, but when Jill keeps giving curt answers he finally 
realizes that this belief was false (see Spaulding 2010). Hence, ToMers believe that 
what drives social interaction is mindreading. Enactivists reject this interpretation. 
Definitions of the relevant terms ‘2nd personal stance’, ‘3rd personal stance’, 
‘interaction’, and ‘observation’ etc. are hard to find in the literature.21 However, I 
believe that, ultimately, it is not necessary to provide such definitions, which would 
be called for if there were vast disagreement about which situations are interactive, 
observational etc.. But this is not the case. Philosophers and cognitive scientists by 
and large agree about which cases they are disagreeing about. The disagreement is 
about the correct analysis of the relevant cases, not about their identity.22  
It is worth noting that the interaction/observation distinction cannot be 
sufficiently identified using a grammatical criterion. The different stances don’t 
map onto the grammatical distinction between the use of the personal pronouns 
“you” (for the interactive stance) and “he”, “she”, “it”, and “they” (for the 
observational stance). Simply put, there are interactions in which we don’t use any 
                                                 
21 Notably, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) is an exception. They give the following definition of “interaction”: Social 
interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the 
coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without 
destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced) (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 493). 
Following an interpretation by Herschbach (2012), “coupling” amounts to the coordinated mutual dependence of the behavior 
of several subjects. Furthermore, coupling can be said to be “regulated” if “engaging in motivated changes to the constraints 
or parameters that influence the coupling” (Herschbach 2012). One worry concerning De Jaegher’s definition is that it might 
not accurately distinguish interaction from mere coordination. Arguably, coordinated action also requires regulated coupling 
between autonomous agents. 
22 Note that other related discussions may well benefit from definitions of these terms. Categorization of the relevant cases is 
far less obvious when, say, comparing interaction to cooperation. After all, it is not intuitively clear which cases exemplify 




of these pronouns. Second, the use of these pronouns doesn’t tell us anything about 
the nature of the respective stances. They could, if anything, just provide a marker. 
 3. The Constitutivist account of “Core Thesis”  
In a series of articles Hanne De Jaegher has developed the view that interaction is 
constitutive of social cognition23 (e.g. De Jaegher et al. 2010; De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007); i.e. interaction is an essential proper part of social cognition. This 
account is intended to stand in opposition to traditional ToMistic views according 
to which social cognition is reducible “to the workings of individual cognitive 
mechanisms” (De Jaegher et al. 2010). De Jaegher argues that “interactive 
processes [...] complement and even replace individual mechanisms” (De Jaegher et 
al. 2010). Her view can be summarized as follows: 
Constitutivism about Interaction. Central features of social cognition in 
interactions cannot be explained solely in terms of each interactor’s 
contributions to these interactions (e.g. their behavior and their mental 
states). Rather, interaction is explanatorily basic for social cognition. 
Note that De Jaegher’s claim is quite radical in that she does not merely hold that 
features of interaction can causally influence an individual’s cognitive processing 
(which would be uncontroversial). 
A general problem with her approach, pointed out by Herschbach (2012), is that 
                                                 
23 “[S]ocial cognition”, in this context, is defined as a “[g]eneral term used to describe different forms of cognition, about, or 
actions in regard to, agents or groups of agents, their intentions, emotions actions and so on, particularly in terms of their 





her constitution claim involves a category mistake. Herschbach asks “[i]n what 
sense could a social interaction be a constitutive element of a neural 
mechanism?”. And he continues “[i]f a constitutive element is understood as a ‘part 
of the phenomenon’ itself, this statement would involve a substantial confusion 
between levels of organization” (Herschbach 2012, 477). The worry, put more 
colloquially, is that interaction is something that goes on between subjects while 
neural processes are something that happen inside one subject. One may worry that 
this critical assessment overextends in that it would amount to a general criticism of 
the extended mind thesis (i.e. the claim that cognition is not confined to what’s 
going on beneath the skull). Hence, rejecting De Jaegher’s claim would require a 
more thorough treatment of the extended mind literature. 
A more immediate problem for De Jaegher’s constitution claim is that her 
examples don’t unambiguously support her case. For instance, she relies on a 
“perceptual crossing” experiment (De Jaegher et al. 2010) conducted by Auvray et 
al. (2009). In this experiment, two blindfolded participants interact with each other 
by moving an avatar along a one-dimensional strip. For each player’s avatar there is 
also a shadow that replicates the avatar’s movements. Furthermore, along the strip 
there is an additional static object. Hence, each player can encounter three different 
objects: The other player’s avatar, the other player’s shadow, and the static object. 
When a player encounters any object she receives sensory feedback. 
For all three objects, the sensory feedback is identical; hence, a player cannot 




information alone. Crucially, when two avatars meet, both players receive sensory 
feedback. When an avatar encounters a shadow only the player whose avatar it is 
receives feedback. 
De Jaegher notes that “in such an impoverished sensory situation, participants 
find each other and concentrate their mouse clicks on each other’s sensors (65.9 % 
of clicks) and not on the identically moving, but non-contingent shadow objects (23 
%)” (De Jaegher et al. 2010, 444). The players’ “finding each other” is explained by 
their behavior when they encounter an object. Upon receiving sensory feedback, a 
player tends to reverse her direction. When an avatar encounters a shadow, the 
avatar reverses direction, but the shadow does not. When two avatars meet, they 
both tend to reverse direction and start oscillating around each other. According to 
De Jaegher, this experiment provides evidence that the agents’ finding each other 
can’t be explained by each player’s contribution. This is because each player is 
inept to even distinguish a shadow from an avatar. 
De Jaegher’s interpretation can be resisted. The perceptual crossing experiment 
does not establish that interaction is basic or constitutive of social cognition. 
Granted the experiment does show that not all features of the interaction can be 
explained by just looking at one player’s contribution. However, everything that 
happens in Auvray’s experiment is entirely predictable if we take into account both 
players’ contributions. The interaction effect De Jaegher describes is fully 
determined by the pattern of sensory feedback that each player receives in 




receiving sensory feedback). The idea, however, that all facts about interactions 
cannot always be explained solely in terms of one interactor’s contribution is not 
very controversial. Suppose, for instance, you and I want to put a stroller on a 
bus. What explains our success in completing this task? Surely, a satisfactory 
explanation would need to appeal to both of our goals; it would need to take into 
account that your actions (say, the speed with which you lift the stroller) have an 
effect on what I do (say, lifting the stroller with equal speed). ToMers can embrace 
the idea that each interactor’s actions have a causal effect on the respective other’s 
cognition. However, what these examples do not show is that interaction is 
constitutive for social cognition. I conclude that the relevant data in support of De 
Jaegher’s view can be explained within an individualistic paradigm. 
In this section, I argued against De Jaegher’s view that interaction cannot be 
understood in terms of individual agents’ cognitive mechanisms. My main line of 
reasoning was that the constitutivist approach lacks convincing examples. In the 
next section, I will focus on the more moderate enactivist theory developed by 
Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto who argue that, although interaction is not 
“basic” in the aforementioned sense, successful interaction does not require 
mindreading. 
4. Shaun Gallagher’s and Daniel Hutto’s account of “Core Thesis” 
Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto defend a type of two-systems account of 
social cognition. System 1 operates fast and unconscious. It does not involve 




Gallagher and Hutto label “primary” and “secondary intersubjectivity” (PIS and 
SIS). PIS enables agents to interact with one another; SIS enables agents to adopt a 
shared perspective with regard to the world. PIS comprises cognitive mechanisms 
such as “gaze following”, “emotion detection”, and understanding of goal-directed 
actions. SIS comprises cognitive mechanisms such as “joint attention” and the 
ability to understand others’ emotionally valenced attitudes towards an object or a 
situation (see Gallagher 2001, 2008a, 2012; Hutto 2004). 
System 2—the mindreading system—is slow, non-modular and solely 
consciously employed. Think, for instance, of the reasoning underlying Sherlock 
Holmes’s painstaking reconstruction of the murderer’s motive. Crucially, such 
conscious reasoning about mental states is not fast enough to guide and direct 
interaction. Typically, Gallagher and Hutto maintain, in interactions there is no time 
for a slow and cognitively costly reconstruction of the other agent’s mental states. 
Therefore, agents have to rely on low level cognitive mechanisms PIS & SIS. 
Furthermore, mindreading is supposed to be constitutively 3rd personal (Hutto 
2004). Hutto explains that “[w]e ascribe causally efficacious inner mental states to 
them [other agents] for the purpose of prediction, explanation, and control” (Hutto 
2004, 549). This amounts to viewing them as “foreign bodies” (ibid., 549) and, 
thereby, taking a spectatorial stance towards them. In contrast, when we interact with 
other agents we rely on more basic forms of “primary” and “secondary 
intersubjectivity” (see Gallagher 2012, 2001, 89; Hutto 2004, 550). 




actions seem unfamiliar and atypical to us (see Gallagher 2001, 92; Hutto 2004). 
In such cases, we theorize about others’ beliefs and desires in trying to explain their 
actions. However, when everything goes as usual mentalizing is unnecessary.24  
System 2 reasoning about mental states is essentially conscious. Therefore, few 
will deny its existence, and I won’t spend time on this part of the enactivist theory. 
Disagreement arises with regard to the enactivist’s system 1. Is it true that the 
unconscious cognitive processes which guide and regulate swift social interaction 
do not employ mindreading? Do system 1 mechanisms SIS and PIS provide 
sufficient cognitive resources to explain successful social interaction? 
Let me discuss what I take to be the two most pertinent and contentious issues. 
First, infants reliably pass interactive, non-verbal false-belief tasks at 18 months of 
age and younger. It is clear that at this young age, infants couldn’t possibly 
consciously reason about false beliefs, or rely on narratives to guide their 
understanding. Hence, the enactivist is called upon to give an ersatz-explanation 
that does not rely on mental state attribution. Second, Hutto and Gallagher adduce a 
principled argument for why mentalizing cannot drive social interactions. This 
argument states that, by ToMers own lights, mentalizing is used to “predict and 
explain” others’ behavior. However, predicting and explaining behavior couldn’t 
possibly be an unconscious process. If mindreading is a conscious process, then it 
could not underlie interaction (for reasons stated above). I will discuss both issues 
                                                 
24 If, in a given situation, these low level cognitive tools don’t suffice, according to Hutto, narratives help us become familiar 






Firstly, in a study by Buttelmann et al. (2009), 18 months old infants succeed in 
helping an adult retrieve an object from a box, while, according to the standard 
interpretation, taking into account the adult’s false belief about the object’s 
location. In the experiment, an infant watches how an adult sees an object being 
placed into one of two boxes (box A). Then, in the false-belief condition, the object 
is moved from box A to a different box (box B) in the adult’s absence. When the 
adult finally tries to retrieve the object from box A (due to her false belief) the child 
helps the adult, leading her to box B which contains the object. The infant, however, 
only helps the adult retrieve the object in the false-belief condition. In the true-
belief condition in which the adult knows the true location of the object and yet still 
opens the empty box, the child helps the adult open the empty box assuming that 
she must have some other reason to open it. 
According to the mentalizing interpretation of the active-helping study (which 
Gallagher rejects), the infant understands that, in the false-belief condition, the adult 
believes that the object is in box A, and that she wants this object. This is what 
motivates the infant to help. According to a different, non-mentalizing 
interpretation (usually labeled “the behavior rule interpretation”), the infant knows 
a rule such as “people look for objects where they last saw them”. Rules such as this 
one are meant to enable the infant to, say, distinguish situations in which the adult 
looks for an object from situations in which she does not look for it. This, in turn, is 




these interpretations, arguing that there is a distinctively enactive way of viewing 
these findings. He states: 
[...] the fact that the infant knows either that the agent has been in a 
position to see the switch or not, plus the agent’s behavior with respect to 
A [...], is enough to specify the difference in the agent’s intention. For the 
infant, that signals a difference in affordance, i.e., a difference in how the 
infant can act, and thereby interact with the agent. The infant does not have 
to make inferences to mental states since all of the information needed to 
understand the other and to interact is already available in what the infant 
has seen of the situation (Gallagher 2012, 201). 
And 
The phenomenological-enactive approach provides an alternative to both 
the ToM and behavioral interpretations (Gallagher 2012, 202). 
Notably, in this passage, Gallagher focuses on knowing “intention[s]” (and not on 
knowing behavior). Accordingly, the enactivist may depart from a behavior rules 
account of social cognition by relying on intention rules: “people intend to look for 
objects where they last saw them”. This interpretation, very much in the behavior-
rule spirit, introduces a further complication: Once the infant knows the adult’s 
intentions, she then has to employ the additional rule “people tend to do what they 
intend”. Therefore, by putting intentions in the focus of analysis, the enactivist 
cannot hope to get around a behavior rule which maps intentions to actions. 




One of the attractions of behavior rules is their alleged parsimony (they don’t 
involve mentalizing of any sort). Intention-rules, on the other hand, do involve 
mentalizing (they involve intention attribution); hence such rules would be less 
parsimonious, and, therefore, we’d be owed an account concerning the benefits of 
such rules. 
A second, distinctively enactive perspective concerns the explanatory role of 
agents’ possibilities for action. Standardly, ToMers hold that the infant’s action 
possibilities (e.g. the possibility to help the adult open the box) are grounded in an 
understanding of the situation; in an understanding that the adult wants the object 
and that she has a false belief about its location. Alternatively, avowed enactivists 
sometimes hold that the direction of explanation should be reversed: Action 
possibilities sometimes ground how objects and situations are represented. This line 
of reasoning is famously adopted by Alva Noë who argues that certain properties of 
perceptual content are constituted by sensory-motor relations. His most thoroughly 
discussed example concerns the perception of a tomato (see Noë 2008). He starts 
with the following observation: Looking at a tomato we can only literally see one 
side of it (the side facing us). Nevertheless, we perceive tomatoes as three 
dimensional objects. We perceive it as an object which has some hidden sides. 
According to Noë, the perceptual content of a tomato as a three dimensional object 
is constituted by or grounded in the “availab[ility] to perception through appropriate 
movement” (Noë 2008, 16). The tomato’s hidden sides are present in perception, 
because upon perceiving one side one has motor access to a visual representation of 




This line of reasoning is reflected in the following quote from Gallagher: 
“[I]nfants understand others in terms of how they can interact with them” (Italics by 
the author) (Gallagher 2012). Hence, understanding others’ mental states may be 
grounded in possible ways to act and interact with the agent. However, without 
taking a stance on Noë’s view on perception, this line of reasoning is hardly 
plausible for the relevant social cognition cases. To see this, reconsider the active 
helping study. Suppose that the infant’s understanding of the adult’s beliefs and 
desires were based on her grasping that it is appropriate to help in one situation but 
not in the other. What, then, explains the child’s sensitivity to situations in which 
helping is (or is not) appropriate? Surely, it cannot be the attribution of beliefs and 
desires. But grasping action possibilities cannot be bare either, simply because 
different situations afford different actions; and first agents need to understand a 
situation in order to know which actions are afforded. 
Noë’s perception-based examples and the “social-cognitive” paradigms are 
disanalogous in an important sense. On the one hand, we have lots of experience 
perceiving, handling, and modifying objects. This is what supposedly grounds 
sensory-motor expectations. We know that objects such as tomatoes will reveal 
hidden sides when we go around them and when we move them in our hands, 
because we have seen this happen many times before. It is not clear what the 
relevant prior experience in the active helping study would be. Surely, we have 
vastly more experience discovering hidden sides of three-dimensional objects than 
we have with others’ false beliefs; especially at 18 months of age. The situation in 




comparatively unique for the child. 
Yet another line of argument frequently adopted by enactivists relates social 
cognition to “direct perception” (Gallagher 2008, 536). According to Gallagher, we 
“have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc.” 
(Gallagher 2008). Intention attributions are therefore not mediated by either a theory 
or a behavior rule, which means that “there is no problem of other minds” 
(Gallagher 2008). Because mental states can be perceived directly, there is simply 
no need for any intermediate cognitive mechanisms. 
The ‘immediate perception’ view is problematic if intended to provide an 
alternative to mentalizing accounts of social cognition. This is because questions 
concerning the contents of perception and questions concerning the underlying 
mechanisms of social cognition should be kept distinct. The basic argument is this: If 
perceptual content is conceptual at least in some cases, then it is a live option for 
theory theorists to argue that the conceptual outputs of a mindreading module can 
be a constitutive part of perceptual states (see Carruthers 2015). Of course, this 
would not provide an immediate answer to the question whether mental state 
concepts can figure in perception. However, it would guarantee the in-principle 
compatibility of theory and a direct perception account of mental states. 
Let me give two arguments in favor of the view that concepts can be part of 
perceptual states. The first argument is phenomenological in nature, the second 
draws on the tight interplay between perception and cognition. In a recent article, 




instance of a kind, K, the concept that represents K is “bound into” the perception of 
S (Carruthers 2015, 6). For an illustration, think of perceiving a cloud. You stare at a 
cloud when all of the sudden you realize that it looks face-like (or, say, wardrobe-
like); i.e. you see the cloud as a face, or as a wardrobe. In such cases, Carruthers 
argues, the concept FACE is bound into the perception of the cloud. Along the same 
lines, theory theorists could argue that the conceptual outputs of a mindreading 
theory module can be “bound into the contents of the perceptual states that provide 
the basis for its interpretations” (Carruthers 2015, 7). Such examples are persuasive, 
because it is hardly plausible that the mental representations FACE, or 
WARDROBE are essentially non-conceptual. 
Secondly, a growing body of literature indicates that there is a tight interplay 
between conceptual knowledge and visual perception. One plausible explanation of 
this interplay is that perception just is conceptual. Evidence comes mainly from 
research concerning links between color perception and color concepts (e.g. Thierry 
et al. 2009; Winawer et al. 2007; Daoutis et al. 2006). One experiment by Daoutis 
et al.’s (2006) involved 4–7 year-old children from either England or Kwanyama 
(Namibia). The crucial difference between both groups was that the Kwanyama 
don’t have distinct color terms for the colors blue and green, blue and purple, and 
red and pink. In the experiment, the children had to find a target color in an array of 
color patches which contained patches of either the target color or distractor colors. 
The distractor colors were designed to be either cross-category for English 
speakers, and within-category for Kwanyama speakers; or, in a second condition, 




faster for the English speakers. This effect did not hold for the Kwanyama speakers 
(for whom there was no within-category condition). One attractive (but not the only 
available) interpretation of the data is that color concepts form a part of color 
perception. This would explain why differences in conceptual knowledge predict 
performance in visual search tasks. 
Carruthers considers an alternative explanation of these findings according to 
which “concept acquisition permanently “warps” the processing that takes place in 
midlevel visual areas” (Carruthers 2015, 9). However, he argues that long-term 
“warping” is unlikely, because interaction effects between color perception and 
color concepts are highly sensitive to online interference effects. Typically, the 
concept-based performance differences in these tasks go away under cognitive load. 
These arguments don’t conclusively settle whether or not perception itself is 
conceptual (or whether conceptual knowledge merely has causal effects on 
perception). But my goal is more moderate. I showed that ToMistic accounts of 
social cognition are in principle able to embrace a direct perception account of 
social cognition. It is at the very least a live option for ToMers to hold that 
perceived mental states could be the result of a complex interplay between 
conceptual mindreading systems on the one hand and perceptual systems on the 
other. 
Let me now go on to discuss enactivist claims concerning the role of prediction 
and explanation of behavior. Enactivists have argued that folk-psychological 




(Gallagher 2001, 102; Gallagher 2012; Hutto 2004, 549). According to enactivists, 
ToMers share this view. 
The claim that what one is doing when mindreading is explaining or predicting 
the other person’s action in terms of mental states, however, is not my claim. It’s a 
claim that is pervasive in the ToM literature (Gallagher 2012, 205). 
Similarly, Hutto writes “it is also generally assumed [by ToMers] that we are 
normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally 
efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and 
control” (Hutto 2004, 548). 
Allegedly, this particular mode of understanding others leads to “estrangement”, 
and, therefore, it cannot serve as the right model for understanding others in 
interactive contexts. Hutto argues that predicting and explaining others’ actions is 
only necessary when actions are unfamiliar to us. In most circumstances, however, 
“we already know what to expect from others and they know what to expect from 
us in familiar social circumstances” (Hutto 2004, 558).25  
Now, “know[ing] what to expect” does not absolve us from predicting what 
others do. Suppose, for instance, you bump into somebody in the hallway whom 
you want to pass. Suppose a convention exists according to which, in these 
                                                 
25 According to Hutto, one reason to favor narrative-based accounts over ToMistic accounts is its phenomenological 
accuracy. We simply don’t go around consciously calculating others’ beliefs and desires all the time. However, it is doubtful 
that narrative-based models fare better with regard their phenomenological accuracy. As it is, we also don’t go around 
recalling stories that might fit a particular interactive situation. Understanding others is often entirely effortless. Therefore, 
any theory about social cognition which gives lots of weight to phenomenological 1st person data will have to refrain from 
positing any explanatory mechanism. This, however, seems implausible. As John Michael argues, surely, in understanding 




situations, both people step to their respective right. Surely, in this case, you know 
what to expect from the other person: she will take a step to her right. You take a 
step to your right and, hence, you both succeed in passing each other. You both 
knew what to expect, because you both knew the pertinent rule for such situations. 
However, the fact that this coordination problem was particularly effortlessly and 
easily solvable does not mean that you didn’t have to predict what the other person 
would do. You predicted that she would take a step to the right and that is why you 
stepped to the right. Of course, this does not entail that the enactivist’s analysis is 
wrong. In fact, there is little reason to assume that solving the hallway problem 
involves mindreading. All it shows is that enactivists will also have to appeal to the 
prediction of others’ behavior at some level in their theory. In the hallway case, the 
prediction might have been facilitated by the existence of a social convention to 
step to the right, which may have obviated the need to mindread. Social predictions 
and explanations can be accomplished in various ways (e.g. through mental state 
attributions, social conventions, or behavior guiding rules). They don’t always 
involve mindreading. However, the view that ordinary social circumstances don’t 
require any predictions is flawed and ToMers’ positions cannot be ruled out on 
those grounds alone. 
A similar argument can be given for ‘explanation’. Actions are often ambiguous; 
one and the same physical action can mean different things and can be interpreted 
in various ways. Reconsider, for instance, the active helping study. When the agent 
comes back and tries to open a box, there are several things she could be interpreted 




Surely, an adequate understanding requires ruling out some of these possibilities. 
Ascribing causally efficacious beliefs and desires is one way to reach adequate 
understanding. According to this model, the child understands what the agent does 
when she knows that the adult wants the object and that she has a false belief about 
its location. 
Enactivists point out that disambiguation does not always require mentalizing. 
Rather, understanding is achieved by certain behavioral scripts and lower level 
cognitive mechanisms. For instance, suppose you stand at the register in the super 
market. The person behind the register reaches towards you. The display reads 
$10.53. The appropriate action in this context is to hand her the money. How did 
you know that this would be the appropriate thing to do? One possibility is that you 
understood that she wanted money from you (and you owe the money). An 
alternative explanation is that acting in this way was just demanded by the 
situational setting. Whichever description turns out to be right, it is clear that there 
needs to be some disambiguating explanation of why the person behind the register 
acted the way she did. Hence, the ToMistic view cannot be ruled out on the grounds 
that they provide some such explanation. 
In this section, I argued that the enactivist defense of Core Thesis does not 
provide a genuine alternative to more conventional accounts of social cognition. On 
my interpretation, Gallagher and Hutto’s views are close to a behavior rule account 
of social cognition which is then combined with a direction-perception account of 




cannot be ruled out merely on the grounds that they involve explanations and 
predictions of behavior. 
5. Gallagher’s and Hutto’s account of “Distinctness” 
Suppose the enactivist were right in that paradigmatic interactions are free of 
mindreading. In this case, as I will now go on to show, she is forced to give an 
enactive analysis of some entirely 3rd personal false belief paradigms (hence, 
undermining the theoretical distinctness between 2nd and 3rd personal paradigms). 
Evidence comes from so-called “spontaneous response” tasks (e.g. Onishi and 
Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007; Woodward et al. 2009). In these tasks, 
children’s understanding of others’ false beliefs is inferred from “behaviors they 
spontaneously produce as they observe a scene unfold” (Baillargeon et al. 2010). 
There are two types of spontaneous tasks. On the one hand there are violation-of-
expectation paradigms which exploit the fact that an infant will look longer at an 
agent or a scene, if her actions don’t match the infant’s expectations. On the other 
hand, there are anticipatory looking tasks which exploit the fact that infants will 
look in the direction of a location in which they anticipate others to act. 
Anticipatory looking can be sensitive to (false) belief attribution, because the infant 
predicts the agents’ actions based on belief attribution. Importantly, spontaneous 
response tasks are observational paradigms in which the infant merely watches a 
certain scene unfold. 




(2005) found that 15-month-olds have an understanding of false beliefs. In this 
experiment, infants were first familiarized with a toy that stands between a green 
and a yellow box and which is then hidden in the green box. Next, the agent reached 
inside the green box to retrieve the toy. Next followed a belief induction faze. In the 
false belief condition the toy was moved from the green to the yellow box while the 
adult was absent. When the adult reached for the box where she didn’t believe the toy 
to be, infants looked reliably longer than when the adult reached for the ball in a 
location incongruent with her false belief about the ball’s location; hence, taking 
into account the adult’s false belief, the infant expected her to look for the toy 
where she falsely believed it to be. 
It is clear that enactivists cannot readily embrace the false-belief-tracking 
interpretation. They believe that belief-desire attributions are the product of 
conscious reasoning. Violation-of-expectation paradigms conducted with 15-
month-old infants are not the purview of enactive system 2 mindreading. 
Furthermore, it would seem quite ad hoc to suppose that Baillargeon’s violation-of-
expectation paradigm on the one hand and Buttelmann’s active helping paradigm 
are in some basic theoretical way distinct. The only motivation for this view would 
be the defense of Distinctness. But, as I said, this seems ad hoc. Hence, the 
enactivist needs to explain the violation-of-expectation findings relying on 
enactivist tools (e.g. in terms of primary and secondary intersubjectivity). Though 
there is nothing interactive about this paradigm; it is entirely observational. 




of effortful conscious thought processes, she has to admit that, at least in some 
cases, enactive social understanding is 3rd personal. This is because infants 
couldn’t possibly consciously reasons about others’ beliefs and desires. If, however, 
the enactivist admits that Baillargeon’s paradigm does involve mindreading, then 
she also has to be comfortable with the idea that mindreading is a largely effortless, 
unconscious process. 
6. Conclusion 
Although it is plausible that social cognition evolved in order to navigate social 
interactions (Carruthers 2009, 167), hard and fast cognitive differences between 
interactive (i.e. 2nd personal), and observational (i.e. 3rd personal) situations prove 
not be supported by the evidence. I have discussed four claims in support of this 
claim: First, in real world scenarios interactive and observational paradigms are 
tightly interwoven. Second, certain allegedly interaction-specific inferences have 
3rd personal counterparts and can therefore also be drawn from an observational 
perspective. Third, De Jaegher’s claim that interaction constitutes social cognition is 
untenable. Fourth, the enactivist idea to relegate mindreading to 3rd personal 
contexts is implausible. 
All told, distinguishing 2nd and 3rd personal contexts based whether they involve 
mindreading, understood as the attribution of beliefs and desires to other agents, is 
not plausible. However, social cognition in both contexts may still be distinct in less 




mindreading (see Qureshi et al. 2010; Surtees and Apperly 2012, Schneider et al. 
2014) may shed further light on subtle issues concerning the exact conditions under 
which mindreading is employed. Moreover, thorough research by Schilbach and 
colleagues show that interactions involve distinct patterns of neural activation which 
is associated with motivational, attentional, and reward related “social cognitive” 
differences. The evaluation of this research would be a further step towards fully 





Chapter 3: Lucky Joint Action 
1. Introduction 
Traditional accounts of joint action (e.g. Bratman 2013; Miller 2001; Tuomela 2005) 
comprise at least the following two necessary conditions for joint action to occur. 
First, an intention condition according to which joint action requires that each agent 
intend the same interdependent end; i.e. an end whose satisfaction requires that each 
party enact their respective part. Next, it is argued that these intentions be common 
knowledge.  
Under the banner of “minimal joint action”, several authors have recently 
challenged the common knowledge requirement. Most notably, Olle Blomberg (2016) 
has argued that, in certain cases, false beliefs about one’s co-participants’ intentions 
are compatible with joint action. Stephen Butterfill (2011) made room for the 
possibility of joint action in young children by simply not including a common 
knowledge condition in his definition of joint action. Similarly, Cordula Vesper et al. 
(2010) do not include common knowledge among the “building blocks” of minimal 
joint action. Lastly, Christopher Kutz (2000) has argued that participants merely need 
to be open to the disclosure of the relevant attitudes; a requirement which is, on 
Kutz’s estimation, weaker than common knowledge.  
Now, although common knowledge of the intentions of each is, according to these 
authors, not necessary for joint action, such knowledge is, in each case, argued to be 
compatible with joint action. Common knowledge is always good, yet not always 




action by pointing to cases in which common knowledge of the relevant intentions 
would act as an underminer for the joint action.  
The principal idea is that joint actions permit a certain degree of luck. In the 
relevant cases, the participants believe that the intentions of each robustly favor the 
joint activity; this belief turns out to be false; the intentions of each do not, in fact, 
robustly favor the joint activity. However, had the actual intentions of each been 
common knowledge, the joint action would not have occurred in the first place. More 
specifically, I have two types of cases in mind; I will, first, analyze a set of cases in 
which common knowledge of some of one’s co-participants’ subplans would 
undermine joint action. In discussing these cases, I will rely on the following 
vignette: 
Lucky Jog. Sarah and Bob both intend that they go jogging. Sarah believes 
that Bob would continue the jog even if it rained. This is important for her! 
Her intention that they go jogging is conditional on her belief that he 
wouldn’t bail if it rained. Her belief about Bob, however, who would bail if 
it rained, is false. Fortunately, sunny weather prevails and they complete a 
happy jog. As it happens, they got lucky. 
Second, I will point to a set of cases in which common knowledge of one’s co-
participants’ joint ends would undermine joint action. Consider the following vignette 
an illustration of this:  
Forking Trip. You and I are in Baltimore. I intend that we go to NYC. As a 




Ocean City. As a means, you intend that we go to Philadelphia. However, I 
only care about going to Philadelphia with you insofar as it is a means to 
going to NYC. If I knew that you intended that we go to Ocean City, I 
would simply fly to NYC. You only care about going to Philadelphia with 
me insofar as it is a means to going to Ocean City. If you knew that I 
intended that we go to NYC, you would simply fly to Ocean City. I, 
however, (falsely) believe that you intend that we go to NYC; you falsely 
believe that I intend that we go to Ocean City. Upon arriving in 
Philadelphia, we discover our mismatched intentions. Nevertheless, we 
jointly went to Philadelphia.  
This chapter is a contribution to specifying minimally necessary conditions for joint 
action. Let me briefly explain why such a project is worthwhile. Most importantly, 
joint action is a pervasive feature of human sociality; that is, “joint action” refers to a 
basic way of acting together that is distinguished from mere parallel action (e.g. Kutz 
2000, 5). To see the difference between both ways of acting, contrast, for instance, the 
case of two strangers walking down Fifth Avenue next to one another each intending 
not to run into the other, and the case of two friends walking together down Fifth 
Avenue. Joint action theory sets out to explicate the distinguishing features of such 
examples. As the walking-together example indicates, joint actions are not confined to 
long-term projects such as building a bridge together (Miller 2001, 75), or going on a 
trip to New York City together (M. E. Bratman 2013). A range of short-term activities 
such as lifting a table together, bouncing a block on a trampoline together (Warneken 




examples suggest that joint action is a ubiquitous and fundamental feature of human 
sociality. Concomitantly, philosophical interest derives (at least in part) from its 
pervasiveness. The literature chimes with this assessment. Margaret Gilbert describes 
joint action as the “social atom” that lies at the very “foundation of human social 
behavior” (Gilbert 2003, 39). Michael Bratman thinks of joint action as the structure 
that grounds “social coordination and planning” (M. E. Bratman 1993, 99). Yet others 
argue that a cognitive adaption for joint action is the central and most basic 
evolutionary ingredient separating “hypersocial” (Tomasello et al., 2005) human 
sociality from the sociality of great apes. 
In section two, I will discuss all relevant pieces of terminology and 
presuppositions. In section three, I will detail two types of assurance in joint action. 
In section four, I will show why the joint actions exemplified in Forking Trip and 
Lucky Jog require that the beliefs of each about the respective other’s intentions be 
false.  
2. Terminology and presuppositions 
In the introduction, I used the somewhat technical terms “ends”, “intentions”, “belief”, 
and “common knowledge”. Let me clarify and explicate these notions.  
Ends and intentions. Joint actions involve some kind of motivating attitude on the 
part of each participant. This attitude is sometimes called a “conative” attitude. The 
exact name and nature of the relevant attitude varies across philosophical accounts. 
According to Seumas Miller, jointly acting agents are said to share the same “end” 




Michael Bratman speaks of regular intentions (with the special content that “we” do 
something (M. E. Bratman 2013, 60). Finally, John Searle famously defends the idea 
of sui generis “we-intentions” (Searle 1990). At times, the specific differences 
between those usages are identified to be merely terminological. According to Raimo 
Tuomela’s assessment (2005, 353), for instance, his “aim-intentions” and Miller’s 
“ends” really amount to the same thing. Other times, the differences between these 
attitudes are taken to be more substantive. Bratman, for instance, argues that only 
intentions, but not goals, can be “agglomerated” (i.e. can be combined) (M. E. 
Bratman 2013, 22). Such differences won’t matter for our purposes. For the duration 
of this chapter, I will mostly use the term “intentions” and “ends” to refer to the 
relevant conative attitudes. I will say that several agents “intend that ___” and, when 
necessary, use the more specific formulation “have as an end that ___.”  
Contents. I will use Bratman-style formulations to specify the contents of the 
relevant conative attitude; these contents have the form “that we ψ.” Hence, I will 
write “you and I have as an end that we go to NYC”26 or “you and I intend that we go 
to NYC.” Using Bratman-style “that we ψ” formulations in part just fixes a 
convention. However, one not entirely conventional merit is that such formulations 
succinctly capture the idea that there is interdependence between the participants’ 
roles. For instance, my intention that we go to NYC cannot be satisfied unless you 
also go. This is because, on Bratman’s account, you enacting your role is part of the 
satisfaction condition of my intention. The idea that joint actions involve some such 
interdependence is widely shared (e.g. Tuomela 2005, 340; Miller 2001, 56; Bratman 
                                                 




2013, 65). Bratman-style formulations capture this idea in a succinct and intuitive 
way. In what follows, I will call ends/intentions with a “that we” content interdependent 
end/intentions. 
Means and Ends. Some intentions are mere means, some are mere ends, and some 
are both. The relevant distinction between means and ends is that, other things equal, 
we only care about the means insofar as we care about the end. Hence, giving up the 
end would, likewise, rationalize giving up the means. The specification “mere” is 
important, because it is, of course, possible to intend something as a means and as an 
end. To see all this more clearly, reconsider Forking Trip. In this example, our 
intention that we go to Philadelphia depends on our intention to go to NYC/Ocean 
City. We each only care about going to Philadelphia insofar as we care about going to 
NYC/Ocean City with the respective other. This dependence marks our intention that 
we go to Philadelphia as a mere means. This is different from the case in which going 
to Philadelphia with you has independent appeal; in which case this intention would 
also be an end. 
Famously, Michael Bratman distinguishes between interdependent ends and the 
means – “sub-plans” (e.g. Bratman 2014, 55) as he calls them – that are realized in 
order to satisfy these ends. Ends and subplans are not merely distinct insofar as they 
are structured by the means-end relation. Subplans and ends are also said to be 
governed by distinct theoretical requirements. Joint action, according to Bratman, 
permits, for instance, that one leave the relevant sub-plans somewhat unspecified. All 




“mesh” in Bratman’s terminology) (see Bratman 2013, 53). Such openness, however, 
is not permitted for the intended ends. Bratman requires that all parties have the same 
interdependent end, not merely that they intend to have the same end.  
Note that Bratman merely requires that the interdependent ends of each agent 
coincide. He does not require that individual ends of each participant coincide. Shared 
intention, according to Bratman, does not “require that the agents participate in the 
pursuit of the same goals. Perhaps you participate in our shared intention to paint the 
house because you do not like the present color, whereas I participate because I want 
to get rid of the mildew” (Bratman 2013, 29). It makes sense that joint action should 
not require our individual ends to coincide. To illustrate, suppose you and I intend 
that we go to NYC together. I, however, plan to go on to travel to Boston; Boston is 
my final destination. The fact that my ultimate end is Boston and not NYC does not 
undermine the possibility for joint action.  
These distinctions are important, because, as announced above, one claim of this 
chapter is that, in some cases of joint action (exemplified by Forking Trip), it is 
required that agents misrepresent their co-participant’s interdependent ends; not their 
individual ends.  
I should note that, throughout this chapter, I will be concerned with two-party joint 
actions only. Joint actions involving larger groups are somewhat special in that, in 
those cases, it may suffice that a proper subset of all participants entertain a certain 
end. In this chapter, I will not be concerned with these intricacies. 




leave the notion of belief unanalyzed. Second, in the context of this chapter, I only 
care about the difference between belief and knowledge insofar as knowledge is 
factive; knowledge entails true belief. Third, several agents commonly know a 
proposition P only if each knows that P, each knows that each knows that P, and so 
on ad inf. Furthermore, if an agent knows that a certain proposition P is common 
knowledge, then it is in fact common knowledge (Bonanno 1996). All this is 
straightforward. Common belief, however, is a bit more entangled. A proposition is 
commonly believed, if each agent believes that P, believes that each believes that P, 
and so on ad inf.; but unlike the case of common knowledge, if an agent believes that 
a proposition is commonly believed, then this does not entail that this proposition is 
commonly believed (Bonanno 1996). But apart from Bonanno’s formal rendition, the 
idea is also independently intuitive. After all, an agent’s belief that a proposition is 
commonly believed might just be false. 
Note also that common knowledge (belief) merely entails such nested knowledge 
(belief); this is not to say that this nested structure constitutes common knowledge 
(belief). Famously, David Lewis (see Lewis 1969; Cubitt and Sugden 2003, 185) 
argued that common knowledge is defined in terms of symmetrically positioned 
reasoning on the part of various agents. Such symmetry is then said to entail nested 
knowledge. Whether Lewis was right need not concern us, because, by 
contraposition, a failure of such nested knowledge entails a failure of common 
knowledge. 




participants in a joint action have actual false beliefs about their co-participant’s (and 
sometimes their own) intentions. This may seem like a departure from the 
philosophical literature. After all, philosophers in a broadly Lewisian tradition couch 
things in terms of mere dispositional, or potential beliefs (for a review see Paternotte 
(2011)). In this chapter, I’m concerned with the question of whether joint action 
requires that the contents of these beliefs (actual, dispositional, or potential) be true. 
Hence, I’m not concerned with the question of whether joint action requires common 
knowledge to be specified in terms of a particular epistemic modality. Therefore, we 
could phrase the examples presented here in terms of (say) dispositions to believe. To 
indicate what this would look like, consider the following rephrasing of Lucky Jog: 
Sarah and Bob both intend that they go jogging. Sarah has a dispositional belief that 
Bob would continue the jog even if it rained. Her dispositional belief about Bob, 
however, who would bail if it rained, is false. Fortunately, sunny weather prevails and 
they complete a happy jog. In this sense, I will argue that joint action sometimes 
requires false dispositional or potential beliefs.  
Let me address one related preliminary worry. Paternotte (2011) observes that 
common knowledge, taken as face value, requires an excessively high epistemic 
standard and is, therefore, not of much use for anything. In most everyday cases, 
Paternotte argues, we don’t have knowledge of other people’s mental states, but, 
rather some type of probabilistically justified belief short of being knowledge. To see 
this, Paternotte has us imagine that a sentence is publicly uttered in the presence of 
person A and person B. This sentence, many would hold, is now common knowledge 




B correctly heard the statement E” (see Paternotte 2011, 255). Absent such certainty, 
we could not have common knowledge of this event which is why Paternotte crafts a 
definition of common knowledge that employs lower standard of justification. Now, 
with this in mind, one might worry that these weakened notions of common 
knowledge already account for the possibility of error in our mutual belief attributions 
which is why the present chapter might seem superfluous. I think this criticism is 
incorrect for two reasons. First, the claim presented in this chapter is not merely that 
joint action is compatible with such false beliefs, but, rather, that it sometimes 
requires these beliefs to be false. Second, Paternotte is concerned with the fact that, in 
ordinary cases, a person’s beliefs about what yet others believe might have been false 
(but are, in fact, true) which is why they do not amount to knowledge. For Paternotte 
this is reason enough to lower the justificatory standards for common knowledge. In 
the present chapter, I will defend the claim that, quite often, joint action requires that 
some of the beliefs about others’ intentions are in fact false. This, however, is not 
Paternotte’s concern. Let’s examine an example to gain a clearer understanding of the 
intended contrast:  
Table or Desk. You and I are participating in a game show. Although we’re 
positioned next to one another, neither of us can see what the respective 
other is doing. Through a loudspeaker the word “table” is uttered in a clear 
and comprehensible manner. We each have a scrap of paper and we are 
tasked with writing down the word that was uttered over the loudspeaker. 
We are given forced choice between the words “table” and “desk”. If we 




each receive 1000 dollars. If we both write down the same, but wrong, 
word we each receive 100 dollars. If we write down different words, we 
receive nothing.  
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the fact that “table” was uttered over the 
loudspeaker creates common knowledge that this word was uttered. This piece of 
common knowledge, in turn, is important for coordinating on the “table” equilibrium. 
To see this, suppose that I know that you heard the word “table” but also thought that 
you think that I heard the word “desk”. In this case, I would think that you will write 
down “desk” which is why I should write down “desk” trying to match your decision. 
Now, Paternotte’s point, as I understand it, is that such coordination games do not 
require actual common knowledge that “table” was uttered, but, rather, a less 
demanding form of probabilistically justified belief. His point is not that coordination 
is possible if our beliefs about what the other person heard were, in fact, false. Cases 
in which such cooperative activities are possible while the beliefs about the others’ 
intentions are actually false are much harder to come by. In this chapter, I explore 
these possibilities with regard to joint action. 
Rationality. Let me add a disclaimer: I will discuss joint action under the 
assumption of common knowledge of rationality. This is a strong assumption in need 
of some justification. First, it is simply worth investigating whether fully rational 
agents could act jointly without common knowledge of some of the relevant 
intentions. Second, in the philosophical literature, common knowledge of all pertinent 




joint action and related cooperative activities (e.g. Lewis 1969; Bratman 1987; 
Rubinstein 1989; Blomberg 2016). Arguing that common knowledge failure is often 
required to enable joint action involving ideally rational agents marks a natural 
extension of the extant literature. Third, if ideally rational agents do not need 
common knowledge of their intentions to successfully engage in joint action, then the 
idea that such knowledge is required for joint action is thoroughly undermined, 
because a common knowledge requirement is often added precisely for the reason 
that rational agents would need it. That said, exploring necessary condition for joint 
action without assuming common knowledge of rationality is a worthwhile endeavor 
in its own right. Unfortunately, it’ll need to be left for another time.  
3. Two types of assurance in joint action 
In this section, I will argue that rationally intending a joint action requires that each 
participant enjoys some appropriate degree of assurance concerning the identity and 
robustness of the intentions of each. Thereafter, in the next section, I will argue that, 
in certain cases of lucky joint action, the success of joint action depends on these 
beliefs being false.  
The first type of assurance (i.e. a belief that rationalizes action) concerns beliefs 
about the intended ends of each participant. The second type of assurance concerns 
beliefs about the intended subplans of each participant. I will discuss each type of 
assurance in turn.  





Rational Intention. One ought not to intend what one believes to be 
impossible.27  
In many cases, the absence of common knowledge of the relevant intentions will 
undermine Rational Intention. This is evidenced by the following vignette: 
Cards. We each intend that we build a house of cards. We each know that we 
intend that we do so. I, however, falsely believe that you falsely believe 
that I intend that we play Blackjack. 
Given my belief that you believe that I intend that we play Blackjack, I will reason 
that you will not act on your intention that we build a house of cards; at least, that is, 
if you are rational. After all, the satisfaction of your intention depends on me enacting 
my part, which you believe I won’t do. Analogously, the satisfaction of my intention 
depends on you enacting your part, which I now don’t think you will do. This puts me 
in a position to believe that, at least if we are rational, I won’t be able to satisfy my 
intention, which, in turn, makes the pursuit of this intention irrational. The moral, 
then, is this: common knowledge of the relevant intentions assures each participant 
that their intention in favor of the joint action is not, in fact, unsatisfiable. Common 
knowledge failure is then taken to undermine such assurance. 
Above, I said that a failure of common knowledge will “in many” (but not in all) 
cases violate Rational Intention. Olle Blomberg (2016) has argued – I think 
convincingly – that, in some cases, a failure of common knowledge of these intentions 
                                                 




need not violate Rational Intention. He gives the following example: 
Hector and Celia. Hector and Celia are about to build a block tower. Each 
intends that they build a block tower, and each intends to do their bit of this 
joint performance. [...] Hector falsely believes that Celia falsely believes 
that he intends to cover the top face of each of her blocks rather than to do 
his bit of their joint performance. (Blomberg 2016, 318) 
Blomberg argues that Hector and Celia is compatible with joint action, in part, 
because it is compatible with rationally intending the joint action (Blomberg 2016, 
319). After all, Hector will think that it doesn’t really matter whether Celia thinks that 
he merely intends to stack wooden cubes on top of her cubes. Stacking blocks on top 
of her blocks is exactly what he would need to do to act in favor of her intention to 
build a block tower. Hence, he shouldn’t expect her to abandon her intention to build 
a block tower. Analogously, Hector should likewise believe that his own intention that 
they build a block tower can be satisfied. 
Importantly, even in Blomberg’s example the participants in a joint action need 
some kind of assuring beliefs concerning the intentions of each. His argument is 
simply that these beliefs need not be a correct representation of the intentions of each. 
To see this, consider an amended scenario in which Hector falsely believes that Celia 
intends to play ‘race car’ with the blocks. Surely, in this case, it would be quite 
irrational for him to intend to build a block tower with Celia (for the familiar reasons 
provided in the discussion of Cards). Blomberg’s point is that the true intentions of 




belief structure needs to be in place. Hence, even in this example, each participant 
needs to be assured that the other’s intentions are, in some sense, appropriately 
related28 to their own intention. If Hector didn’t believe that their intentions were so-
related Hector would be irrational in retaining any of the intended subplans in favor 
of building a block tower.  
Furthermore, in Blomberg’s example, joint action is compatible with each 
knowing the respective other’s interdependent end. Both do intend that they build a 
block tower. Common knowledge of this intention would, surely, not undermine joint 
action. Knowing the other’s intentions isn’t necessary but wouldn’t hurt either. In the 
next section, I will discuss cases in which such knowledge would, in fact, undermine 
the possibility of joint action. 
I will now turn to a second type of assurance in joint action that is closely related 
to Bratman’s idea that, in joint action, the agents’ subplans need to exhibit some (yet 
to be specified) degree of “mesh” (M. E. Bratman 2013, 54). Bratman gives an 
illustrative example: Suppose we each intend that we go to NYC.  
Your and my subplans can mesh even if they do not match. Perhaps your 
subplan specifies that we not go during rush hour, whereas mine leaves that 
issue open yet our sub-plans are co-realizable. Further, what is central to 
shared intention is that we intend that we proceed by way of sub-plans that 
mesh. This can be true even if, as we know, our sub-plans do not now mesh, 
so long as we each intend that in the end our activity proceed by way of a 
                                                 




so-lution to this problem. Nor need we each be willing to accept just any 
specifi-cation of activities of each that would suffice for the intended end. (M. 
E. Bratman, 2013, 54).  
One of the ideas expressed in this example is that while subplans don’t need to be 
fully specified, we nevertheless need not be willing “to accept just any specification”. 
I’d now like to elaborate on this idea and formulate a necessary condition concerning 
the required level of specification for joint action. 
The rough idea is this: In joint actions, agents need to be assured not only that the 
intended action is possible (as argued above), but also that the intentions of each will 
persist through a range of counterfactual situations; i.e. that these intentions are 
sufficiently robust.29 To see this, consider the following vignette: 
Canceled Jog. Jane and Trevor both intend that they go jogging. It is common 
knowledge between them that they so intend. Jane, however, believes that 
Trevor will bail at the slightest sign of rain. Jane, on the other hand, doesn’t 
care about the rain. In fact, she greatly enjoys the rain while jogging. There 
are clear signs of rain today; so Jane, thinking of Trevor’s disposition to 
bail, abandons her intention that they go jogging. 
Jane’s decision seems perfectly rational. Given that Trevor will likely bail, it’s simply 
too risky for her to set out to go jogging with him. Hence, for Jane it is not enough to 
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know that Trevor intends as she does. She needs further assurance that his intentions 
are somewhat robust, or, as Bratman would have it, that there is sufficient degree of 
mesh between their subplans. But how robust exactly? 
When formulating a constraint that captures Jane’s reasoning in Canceled Jog we 
have to be careful. We certainly don’t want to stipulate a fixed credential threshold to 
indicate a participant’s certainty that the intentions of each will be satisfied. To see 
this, consider the following example: 
Risky Jog. I promise you one million dollars if you go on a five-mile jog with 
my friend Bob. You know that Bob will bail at the slightest sign of rain. It’s 
looking rainy right now and you believe that, most likely, Bob will bail 
before the five miles are completed. The payoff, however, is alluring; so 
you intend that you and Bob go on a five-mile jog. 
In Risky Jog, you have a low degree of belief that your intention will be satisfied. 
However, given the particular settings of the case, it seems perfectly reasonable for 
you to intend as you do. Hence, we need a constraint weak enough to capture the 
reasoning behind Risky Jog. I propose the following provisional definition: If two 
agents, A and B, intend that they J, then: 
Moderate Robustness (provisional). For each agent, there exists a minimal 
set of circumstances, CA (CB), such that, if A (B) continues to intend that 
they J, then A (B) believes that it is commonly believed by all participants 




This is a mouth full. But an illustration will illuminate the mechanics of this principle. In 
Canceled Jog, Jane’s set CJ contains rainy circumstances. She will continue to intend 
that they go jogging, only if she believes that she herself and Trevor would continue 
the jog in rainy circumstances. Hence, in Canceled Jog, she abandons her intention 
that they go jogging, because she does not believe that Trevor’s intention would 
persist under rainy circumstances. In this case, it is false that each believes that all 
participants’ intentions persist under rainy circumstances, because Jane herself doesn’t 
believe that Trevor’s intention would so persist. 
C is a “minimal” set. This means that a participant would abandon her intention 
given any proper subset of C. Furthermore, an agent’s set C is held rationally, if it 
maximizes the agent’s utility. The thought is simple: Suppose Jane thinks that it will 
likely rain and the disutility she would experience from Trevor’s bailing under rainy 
circumstances would be great. In this case, the expected utility associated with going 
on a jog with Trevor might just be too low to justify maintaining and acting on her 
intention. 
Let’s, next, be precise about the exact content of the belief of common belief 
specified in Moderate Robustness (provisional). The added precision will lead to a 
slight amendment of this principle. Let’s again use Canceled Jog as an example. 
Jane’s intention that they go jogging is predicated on her belief that Trevor will jog 
even if it rains. Rainy circumstances are part of her set CJ. Does she have to believe 
that rainy circumstances are also part of Trevor’s set CT? No, because although Trevor 




happy to seek shelter should Jane wish to do so. Rainy circumstances might not, as it 
were, be part of his minimal set CT; i.e. his intention that they go jogging might not 
depend on him thinking that she will continue the jog in rainy circumstances. Now, 
intuitively, it only matters to Jane that Trevor won’t bail if it rains; it does not matter 
to her whether running in the rain is part of his minimal set CT. Instead, Jane needs to 
believe that Trevor believes that she shares all the elements specified in the set CT 
indexed to him.  
Furthermore, Jane needs to believe that Trevor believes that Jane believes that he 
shares the elements of CJ indexed to herself. To see this, consider the following line 
of reasoning: if Trevor thought that Jane believed that he didn’t share the elements in 
her set CJ then he would be in a position to reason that she will abandon her intention 
that they go jogging. This, in turn, would rationalize his abandoning the intention that 
they go jogging. The upshot, then, is this: Trevor and Jane are required to entertain 
the nested type of beliefs typical of common belief; however, the contents of these 
nested beliefs alternate from one level to the next in the way indicated above. Based 
on these considerations we should reformulate the above principle as follows: If two 
agents, A and B, intend that they J, then: 
Moderate Robustness. For each agent, there exists a minimal set of 
circumstances, CA (CB), such that, if A (B) continues to intend that they J, 
then: 
(i) A (B) believes that they each intend that they J in all circumstances 




(ii) A (B) believes that B (A) believes that they each intend that they J 
in all circumstances specified in CB (CA). (The crucial point is that 
the indexes “B” and “A” are reversed as compared to (i). More 
generally, these indexes reverse at each level relative to the 
previous one.) 
(iii) A (B) believes that B (A) believes that A (B) believes that they 
each intend that they J in all circumstances specified in CA (CB ) 
and so on ad inf. 
This concludes my rendition of assurance in joint action. First, the participants need 
to be assured that the satisfaction of their intentions is possible. Second, the 
participants need to be assured that the relevant intentions favor the joint action in a 
robust fashion. 
4. Intentions in the context of assurance 
In this section, I will put to work what we have learned so far and argue that, given 
each participant’s enjoyment of the kind of assurance set out above, acting jointly 
sometimes depends on misrepresenting the intentions of one’s co-participant. To start 
seeing this, re-consider Lucky Jog: 
Lucky Jog. Sarah and Bob both intend that they go jogging. Sarah believes 
that Bob would continue the jog even if it rained. This is important for her! 
Her intention that they go jogging is conditional on her belief that he 




it rained, is false. Fortunately, sunny weather prevails and they complete a 
happy jog. As it happens, they got lucky. 
Consider also another example with larger scope: 
Lucky Marriage. Ian and Mia stand on the altar each vowing: “I promise to 
be true to you in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health.” Both Ian 
and Mia intend this to be an honest expression of their conviction; they are, 
as it were, sure that they will be able to keep this promise. So they get 
married. By all measures, their marriage turns out to be truly wonderful. It 
lasts for 50 happy years until they both pass away. The “bad” times, in 
which, as they promised, they would stay together never came. There was 
no sickness, no temptation and the like. Had such bad times come around, 
Mia would not have stood by Ian. The same is true of Ian. However, had it 
been known to them that their marriage could not endure such bad times, 
they would have never gotten married in the first place. In fact, had it been 
known to them that they themselves could not keep this promise, they 
would not have gotten married either. Their belief that the respective other 
had robust intentions to stay together was crucial to them, despite the fact 
that, under pressure, it would not have held up. They both got lucky!30 
Sarah, as well as Ian and Mia have false beliefs about the robustness of the respective 
other’s as well as their own subplans. Each misrepresents the robustness of their co-
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participant’s as well as their own intentions. Nevertheless, the actions described in 
these vignettes are perfectly joint for the following reasons: First, it just seems 
intuitive that these are cases of joint action. Should we pay attention to such intuitions 
when defining joint action, or should we instead keep our focus on independent 
theoretical considerations? I think we should, in fact, pay attention to our considered 
intuitions for the following reasons. First, there is no agreement about the theoretical 
role of joint action. Butterfill (2011), for instance, argues that joint action plays a role 
in enabling mindreading in infants. Joint action should, therefore, not presuppose 
mindreading which is why Butterfill opts for a sparse definition of joint action. 
However, whether (and the extent to which) mindreading needs enabling is, in fact, 
contentious and heavily debated in the literature (for a review consult Carruthers 
(2013)). Some have argued that mindreading is a thoroughly innate capacity and can 
be traced experimentally even to infants as young as 6 months. It seems to me that the 
theoretical role of joint action is insufficiently understood which is why basing one’s 
definition of joint action on the theoretical role proves difficult.31 Future research of 
the sort initiated by researchers such as Butterfill (2012) and, relatedly, Vesper et al. 
(2010) will show whether findings in, say, developmental psychology can help 
ground definitions of joint action.  
That said, one uncontroversial theoretical desideratum of joint action theory is that 
it is a basic and ubiquitous form of social interaction (see introduction). This 
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assessment would have to be revised if it were denied that Lucky Jog and Lucky 
Marriage are joint actions. After all, there is nothing at all contrived about these 
cases. Jointly acting agents are regularly mistaken about the degree of robustness of 
their co-participants’ intentions. In some cases, the problematic counterfactuals do 
materialize, which, in turn, leads to a breakdown of the joint action. However, in 
many other cases, in which the relevant counterfactuals do not materialize, this leads 
to the pursuit of perfectly normal joint actions. 
A critic might object that joint action marks, in some sense, an ideal way of acting 
together; a way of acting together that is particularly safe and can’t, therefore, come 
about through lucky circumstances. I think this criticism is misguided. Quite frankly, 
joint action does not mark an ideally safe way of acting together. Rather, – and the 
philosophical literature concurs – joint action is a basic and ubiquitous type of social 
action (see above). It is, as it were, the actual base of sociality, and not an ideal to live 
up to. There are in fact countless ways to make joint actions more safe and reliable 
(e.g. through third-party enforced contracts, explicit promising, mutually known 
expectations, or habitual action (e.g. Michael and Pacherie, 2014) that go way beyond 
what is minimally required for joint action to occur.  
Therefore, giving up on the idea that joint action is ubiquitous and socially basic is 
a high theoretical cost. After all, philosophical interest in joint action is, as I showed 
at the beginning of this chapter, stoked, at least in part, by the conviction that joint 
action is a fundamental way of acting together. 




should require that all participants have some appropriate degree of assurance 
concerning the range of subplans intended by each participant. We should, however, 
not require that these beliefs be true. Furthermore, in Lucky Jog and Lucky 
Marriage, both pairs of agents engage in join action, yet knowledge of the range of 
subplans intended by each would readily undermine the joint action. 
Let me now apply this insight to a second set of cases. In these cases, the 
participants’ intended interdependent ends are incompatible and knowledge of these 
ends would undermine the joint action. To see this more clearly, re-consider Forking 
Trip. In this case, going to Philadelphia requires that we each have false beliefs about 
the respective other’s end. If we knew that our ends didn’t match, we would abandon 
our trip altogether and our jointly going to Philadelphia would be undermined. Our 
jointly going to Philadelphia depends on our false beliefs about the intended 
interdependent ends of each. The intuition, however, is that we jointly go to 
Philadelphia. Given the above analysis of assurance, we’re now in a position to 
defend this intuition on principled grounds.  
To be very clear, the claim is not that Forking Trip is entirely devoid of matching 
interdependent intentions. Surely, in this example, both of us have matching 
interdependent subplans; namely that we go to Philadelphia; and this subplan is itself 
an interdependent intention with a “that we φ”-type content. Rather, merely our 
intended interdependent ends are incompatible and not jointly realizable. Why should 
we believe that Forking Trip presents a case of joint action?  




behavioral respects, indistinguishable from the case in which we both intend, as an 
end, that we go to Philadelphia. In both cases, we appropriately support one another, 
and our actions are equally interdependent.  
Second, a critic might further object that the impossibility to co-realize both ends is 
problematic for a different reason; namely, that it renders the ends irrational. This 
objection is, again, misguided. According to the intuitive principle Rational Intention, 
rationally intending does not require that it be possible to satisfy the intention. Rather, 
mere belief that the satisfaction is possible is required. A stronger and, arguably, more 
controversial principle of rationality is required to render the relevant ends in Forking 
Trip irrational. 
Third, the critic might go on objecting that the relevant beliefs are not robust 
enough, because joint action requires, as Kutz (2000) puts it, that “no one would 
modify his or her plans in virtue of disclosure.” In Forking Trip, however, disclose 
of our ends would undermine the joint action. This point is no doubt true; but it 
overextends. In Lucky Jog and Lucky Marriage, the joint action would not survive 
the revelation of the actual robustness of each participant’s intention. However, at 
least in those cases, this does not sanction the judgment that these actions are not truly 
joint actions. The critic would have to further argue that the actual ends are special in 
some sense, such that the joint action should survive the revelation of the ends, but 
not their subplans. This move, however, seems unmotivated, and ought to be rejected 
for the sake of the theory’s consistency and simplicity. 




Bernhard Schmid (2016) have recently employed and expanded the Anscombian idea 
that acting intentionally requires, quite generally, some form of teleological 
rationalization (Laurence 2011; Schmid 2016). Thus, intentionally acting agents can 
answer the question “Why?” they act as they do. To illustrate, suppose you fill up a 
kettle with water in order to make tea. When asked “Why should you want to fill it 
up?’” (Laurence 2011, 278) you might answer “Oh, because I want to make tea” 
(Laurence 2011, 278). Intentional action is said to depend on such rationalizations. 
Similarly, intentional joint agency is, then, likewise said to depend on the availability 
of such rationalizations. What is more, each participant’s contribution to a joint action 
needs to be rationalized with reference to a joint (i.e. collective) action. To illustrate 
further, suppose a band of robbers are robbing a bank. The various robbers have 
different tasks. One robber’s job is to crack open the safe. If their robbing the bank is 
indeed a joint activity then the robbers’ individual actions (e.g. cracking open the 
safe) are rationalizable with regard to the joint end of robbing the bank. If asked, 
“Why is he cracking the safe?” the answer “because the band of robbers is knocking 
over Mellon bank” (Laurence 2011, 278) is appropriate. Laurence further requires 
that in joint actions such rationalizations should be the same for each participant (see 
Laurence 2011, 282). Hence, the explanation “because the band of robbers is 
knocking over Mellon bank” marks the teleological endpoint of their joint action that 
rationalizes each robber’s contribution.  
This line of reasoning generates an apparent objection against the claim presented 
in this chapter. Presumably, in Forking Trip, each of us will rationalize their actions 




going to NYC”, citing my interdependent end; you, on the other hand, will answer 
“because we are going to Ocean City”, citing your interdependent end. But each of 
the rationalization that we provide are false. We’re neither jointly going to NYC, nor 
are we jointly going to Ocean City. Our joint action merely extends as far as one of 
our subplans. Hence, the teleological rationalization that each of us provides is false.  
To answer this objection, we should first understand why we should accept this 
particular rationalization criterion in the first place. Schmid stresses that intentional 
agency requires that agents have available some rationalization for their actions. He 
explains that “it has to be apparent to us what it is we’re doing, or else intentional 
action breaks down” (Schmid 2016, 52). To see this more clearly, he provides the 
following example for such a breakdown in agency:  
Fridge. “Imagine that during a short break after some hours of intense work 
on a paper at your desk, still thinking about your paper, you find yourself in 
the kitchen, opening the fridge, not knowing what it is you’re doing there. 
Perhaps your cluelessness does not run all the way down to your present 
bodily movements—you know perfectly well that you’re opening the 
fridge—but you have no idea as to the question of why you’re doing it. 
Were you about to get something from there, or put something back? You 
still feel utterly lost and rather stupid for a moment, and intentional action 
has broken down […]” (Schmid 2016, 52). 
Individual agency, Schmid argues, requires that an agent can answer the relevant 




agency, as Schmid and Laurence suspect, requires that participants can answer the 
“Why?” question by citing their joint end.  
Now, I take it that, in Forking Trip, the mere availability requirement of such a 
rationalization is satisfied. After all, in said vignette both of us will rationalize their 
actions with regard to an intended joint action. If you are asked “Why are you on this 
bus?” you will answer “because we’re going to Ocean City together”; likewise, I will 
answer “because we’re going to NYC together.” Hence, although false, we do have a 
rationalization at hand.  
Should we add the further requirement that each of our answers to the “Why?” 
question be true? The answer, I think, is not obviously “yes.” The simple reason is 
that agents can be mistaken about the particular explanations they invoke to 
rationalize their actions. Yet such confabulation does not obviously seem to render 
their actions unintentional (unlike the way the actions in Fridge seem unintentional 
and devoid of agency). Carruthers (2011, 342) and Wegner (2002) discuss 
experimental cases in which subjects carry out an instruction that was given to them 
under hypnosis and who “will often confabulate an explanation for their action citing 
some or other particular intention” (Carruthers 2011, 342). For instance, subjects will 
follow the instruction “when I see the book on the table, I shall place it on the shelf.” 
When later asked why they placed the book on the shelf, subjects confabulate an 
intention such as that they intended to tidy the room. Similarly, Schmid contends that 
our intentions are not always transparent to ourselves. He invokes the example of two 




quarrel was to break up the friendship (Schmid 2016, 57). 
Although we should agree that agents should be able to give a rationalization for 
their intentional actions, it seems at best controversial that intentional agency should 
depend on the truth of those avowed rationalizations. Now, the rationalizations that 
the agents in Forking Trip would provide are false. When I answer the question 
“Why are you on this bus?” by saying “because we’re going to NYC”, I’m saying 
something false; however, as we’ve seen we shouldn’t require such rationalizations to 
be true – neither in the context of individual agency, nor in the context of joint 
agency.  
Summing up, we should agree that, in the context of joint action, there should be a 
description under which we act jointly. This description may well correspond to a 
subplan of ours. In Forking Trip, this description is “jointly going to Philadelphia”. 
We can further concur with Schmid’s claim that intentional agency requires that an 
agent be able to have available an answer to the relevant “Why?” question. After all, 
in Fridge intentional agency really seems to have broken down; hence intentional 
agency seems to depend on the availability of such rationalizations. We can also 
concede that, in the context of joint action, the answer to this “Why?” question should 
refer to a joint action (e.g. “I φ because we ψ”). However, we don’t need to concede 
that the answers to such “Why?” questions necessarily be veridical. Bar such a 
veridicality requirement, the Anscombian approach to joint action does not 
undermine the jointness of Forking Trip. For these reasons, I conclude that there are 




the ones put forward by the traditional accounts. 
Lastly, a critic might object that, in Forking Trip, both of our ends could not, in 
fact, be co-realized; however, the objection continues, we should require that, in the 
context of joint action, the ends of each must be mutually co-realizable. Note that this 
objection is close to being a brute denial of the idea that Forking Trip is a joint 
action; after all, one of the central claims of this chapter is that, in joint actions, the 
intended ends don’t need to be co-realizable. As such, the objection is much more a 
mere assertion of a clash of intuitions than it is a structured objection. A mere clash of 
intuition produces a stand-off. However, I think by now we have gathered extensive 
evidence supporting the idea that this example does present a case of joint action. We 
saw that this example is compatible with an intuitive way to spell out rational 
intending, it is a natural extension of our assumption that joint actions are socially 
basic, and the behaviors specified in this example are behaviorally indistinguishable 
from more mundane cases of joint action.  
So far, we have looked at examples of lucky joint action in which incompatible 
intentions remain undisclosed to the participants for the duration of the joint action. 
We may further ask whether joint action depends on the non-disclosure of the 
pertinent incompatible intentions even after completion of the action. The answer, I 
think, is that it does not. But let’s first explicate why one might think that it does. 
Reconsider, Forking Trip; suppose that, having arrived in Philadelphia, we find out 
that we are on our way to different cities. In hindsight we might be inclined to judge 




want to say that our jointly going to Philadelphia depends on our not finding out that 
our intentions were incompatible all along. I think this assessment is wrong. To see 
this, we should, once again, see the parallel to Lucky Jog. Suppose we come home 
from a nice jog. As theorists, I have argued that, at this point we are entitled to judge 
that Sarah and Bob jointly went for a jog. If lucky joint action depended on non-
disclosure of the incompatible intentions, this judgement would be inappropriate. 
Rather, we would only be entitled to judge that Sarah and Bob went on a jog together 
provided that they won’t find out about the discrepancy in intention later on. This, I 
think, is implausible. After we have come home from a nice jog, the question whether 
we went on a jog together is settled. Similarly, consider the case in which, having 
arrived in Philadelphia, we both get urgent calls from home and the both of us have to 
rush back to Baltimore. At this point it seems to be settled – given the above analysis 
is right that is – that we jointly went to Philadelphia. If Lucky Joint action were 
dependent on persisting non-disclosure of the discrepant intentions, we would have to 
hold off on this judgement, because our discrepant attitudes may be disclosed at a 
later point in time.  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I’ve argued that joint actions can be “lucky”. In these cases, jointly 
acting agents are mistaken about their co-participant’s subplans and interdependent 
ends. Furthermore, in the relevant cases, the joint action depends on these mistaken 
beliefs; common knowledge of the relevant intentions would undermine the 





















Chapter 4: Coordination Through Precedent Without Common 
Inductive Standards 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following case:  
Fast Food. You and I want to meet for lunch. We have two options: 
McDonald’s or Wendy’s. We don’t care where we’ll have lunch as long as 
we’ll have lunch together.  
In situations such as this one, each of us is trying to predict what the other is going to 
do in an attempt to match our choices. These predictions can be justified in various 
ways. Maybe we have antecedently agreed or promised to each other that we would 
go to McDonald’s. But suppose that we have no explicit agreement to go on, but that, 
instead, we have always gone to McDonald’s in the past. In this case, you may rely 
on precedent and simply reason as follows: “Since that’s where we’ve always gone, 
that’s where she’ll go again”. For ease of presentation, let’s call the proposition 
“We’ve always gone to McDonald’s” proposition A, and the proposition “You (or I 
respectively) will go to McDonald’s” proposition xy/I. We can, then, represent the 
evidential relation between A and xy/I as follows: 
(1) A↝xy/I 
The squiggly arrow indicates that the inference is defeasible; i.e. valid only by 




necessitate that this is what we shall do.32 In predicting your behavior, I may use 
what’s stated in (1). Let KI/y denote “I/you know that ...”. We may, then, represent my 
reasoning process as follows: 
(2)  KI(xy) because KI(A) and KI(A ↝xy) 
I know that you’ll go to McDonald’s, because I know that this is what we’ve always 
done, and because I know that people tend to continue to act as they have in the past.  
Although, these claims are couched in terms of knowledge (instead of, say, 
certainty, belief, degrees of belief, or reason to believe) this should be taken more as a 
convention rather than a substantive commitment. As Harvey Lederman (2018) 
stresses, in debates about coordination the term “common knowledge” is often used 
as a catch-all term for “common knowledge, common belief, and common certainty”. 
In this chapter, knowledge will often be important only insofar as it entails belief; and 
many of the examples that follow will be couched in terms of (common) belief.  
Now, it has been said that, at least in the context of coordination games, the line of 
reasoning presented in (3) is incomplete. Famously, David Lewis has argued that 
predicting another agent’s behavior using precedent as a source of evidence depends 
on the “mutual ascription of some common inductive standards […].” (Lewis 1969, 
56f). Similarly, Sugden and Cubitt, analyzing Lewis on convention, require that the 
players “have reason to believe that, in particular relevant respects, they have 
common background information and common inductive standards” (Cubitt and 
                                                 
32 For this reason Cubitt and Sugden (2003) say that A gives a “reason to believe” that x is the case. Alternatively, using Lewis’ 




Sugden, 2003, 185). A common inductive standard is a piece of knowledge (belief, or 
reason to belief) that a particular salient feature (e.g. precedent) is a “projectible 
regularity” (Cubitt and Sugden 2003, 198) such that “each person must have reason 
to believe that each other person shares his own standards about what can be inferred 
inductively from A” (my italics) (Cubitt and Sugden 2003, 198). Extending this 
thought, Christina Bicchieri has suggested that, to select an equilibrium in a 
coordination game, “we must introduce some salience criterion of choice, and 
common knowledge thereof […]. Salience may be provided by precedent [...]” (my 
italics) (Bicchieri 2006, 36). Similarly, Cyril Hédoin has argued that the players need 
“common knowledge […] that they share the same reasoning modes” (Hédoin 2014, 
380). In summary, the thought is that simply having the same standards of inference 
is not enough for successful coordination; rather, the players need additional beliefs 
or knowledge that the respective others are disposed to reason similarly. 
To see the putative importance of a common inductive standard we should 
examine a case in which it is missing: Reconsider Fast Food and suppose for a 
minute that I am initially inclined to predict your behavior using precedent; suppose 
also that, this time around, I think that you falsely believe that I intend to defy 
precedent predicting that I have decided to go to Wendy’s instead. Of course, in this 
case, it would seem quite silly to stick to my guns and use precedent as my inductive 
standard. I know that you are going to try to match what you believe I will do and, 
thus, go to Wendy’s. If my goal is to coordinate with you, then I should likewise go to 
Wendy’s. Hence, in predicting your behavior, I ought not only to know what we’ve 




McDonald’s using precedent as a standard of inference. 
Adding a common inductive standard to formulation (2) we obtain: 
(3) KI(xy) because KI(A) and KI(A↝xy) and, as one precondition, KI(Ky(xI) 
because Ky(A) and Ky(A ↝xy)). 33 
This statement reads as follows: I know that you will go to McDonald’s in the future, 
(a) because I know that we’ve gone to McDonald’s in the past, (b) because I know 
that people tend to act in the future as they have in the past, and (c) because I know 
that you think that I will go to McDonald’s for the same reasons (i.e. because you 
know that we’ve done so in the past, and because you know that people tend to act in 
the future as they have in the past).  
In this chapter, I will argue that the common inductive standard requirement 
expressed in (3) is implausible for two reasons. First, it implies a higher-order belief 
about what the other player thinks oneself will do. However, predicting another 
player’s behavior based on precedent is incompatible with the presence of such 
higher-order beliefs. The following argument, which I will explicate in this chapter, 
shows this: 
P1 – Interdependence. In a two-player pure coordination game between 
                                                 
33 Vanderschraaf and Sillari (2013) formulate this idea in terms of “symmetric reasoning”. Symmetric reasoners know that an 
inference that the agent herself can draw can also be drawn by another agent. Formally, this idea is expressed as follows: [Ki(A) 
⇒ Ki(E) and Ki(A) ⇒ KiKj( A′), then Ki(A′)] ⇒ KiKj( E); i.e. if an agent can infer E from A, and the agent can infer that the other 
agent knows A, then she is also in a position to know that the other agent knows E. The definiens says that for each agent i, 
if i can infer from A′ that E is the case and that everyone knows that A′ is the case, then i can also infer that everyone knows 




player A34 and player B, A’s first-order prediction about what she takes B to 
choose provides sufficient reason for her own rational strategy choice. 
P2 – Double Justification. A’s belief about what she takes B to choose can be 
justified by appeal to (a.) precedent, or (b.) higher-order beliefs suitably 
characterized (e.g. what A believes B believes that A will choose).  
P3 – Higher-Order Defeat. In pure coordination games, justifications based 
on higher-order beliefs always defeat justifications based on precedent. 
— 
C – Absence Precondition. Precedent can justify A’s belief about B’s strategy 
choice only if A has no second-order belief about what B thinks A will 
choose (e.g. beliefs about what B believes A will choose). 
The argument makes explicit an evidential relation between first-order behavioral 
predictions, precedent, and second-order beliefs. As the chapter unfolds, we will see 
that the argument generalizes for second, third, and, ultimately, nth level behavioral 
predictions.  
The second reason rendering (3) implausible is that, sometimes, we want to 
explain common knowledge that a certain inductive standard is used by appeal to the 
independent predictive power of precedent-based inferences. If these inferences were 
to presuppose such common knowledge, then these explanations would turn out to be 
                                                 
34 The argument is stated from player A’s perspective. This is just to avoid clutter. The reader should fill in the exact same 





Before continuing further, I should add a caveat. The “common inductive 
standards” requirement depends on various idealizing assumptions. For instance, the 
idea that reasoning from precedent depends on infinitely many nested higher-order 
beliefs about the inductive standard may depend on the assumption that the players 
are unbounded reasoners. Furthermore, the idea that a player may only base her 
predictions of the other’s behavior on precedent provided that the other does so as 
well, depends, at least on the face of it, on the idea that the player is rational, and, for 
further iterations, on the idea that their rationality is common knowledge.  
Many have found it implausible that successful and reliable coordination should be 
premised on infinitely complex higher-order beliefs. The remedy has usually been to 
relax at least one of the various idealizing assumptions. Harvey Lederman (2017) has 
argued that coordination can be facilitated by letting go of the assumption that the 
players’ rationality is common knowledge. Players can be rational, but they need not 
be smug; i.e. they might not know that they are rational. Others (e.g. Kneeland 2012) 
have argued that bounded reasoners can coordinate without common knowledge. Yet 
others (e.g. Skyrms 2004) have explored coordination in entirely non-strategic 
contexts.  
In this chapter, I won’t follow these approaches and, thus, keep all rationality 
assumptions. These are strong assumptions and the decision to keep them needs a bit 
of justification. First, it is simply worth investigating whether fully rational agents 




literature, such common inductive standards are often added because rational agents 
would need them to coordinate their actions. Hence, a discussion of these standards 
under these idealized circumstances marks a natural extension of the extant literature. 
Third, the reason these assumptions are often dropped is to lend empirical validity to 
a particular model. Actual agents, it is sometimes argued, simply aren’t unbounded 
reasoners and don’t commonly know that they are rational. In this chapter, my 
primary concern is not empirical validity, but, rather, a principled investigation into 
the tension between reasoning from precedent and higher-order expectations. Lastly, 
any successful theory of coordination should hold up under idealized circumstances, 
as it would be quite surprising if successful coordination were to require cognitive 
limitations.  
In the early days of research on coordination (e.g. Rubinstein 1989) and cognate 
cooperative activities such as joint action (e.g. Bratman 1989), and conventional 
behavior (e.g. Lewis 1969), common knowledge that each participant will choose a 
particular strategy was seen as a requirement. This sentiment finds its most rigorous 
expression in Rubinstein’s Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail games. 
Subsequently, many had noticed that such common knowledge requirements depend 
on various idealizing assumptions (see above) and that relaxing these assumptions 
may render these requirements unnecessary. In each case, it is nevertheless argued 
that common knowledge is, although not necessary for coordination, always 
compatible with it. This idea has recently been challenged. Common knowledge 
requirements can, at times, be harmful to coordination (see Lederman 2017; 




that solving a coordination game relying on precedent is in tension with common 
knowledge that this standard is used.  
In the first part of this chapter (section 2 – 4), I will show why the common 
inductive standard requirement expressed in (3) is implausible. In the second part 
(section 5), I will provide an alternative. More concretely, in the next section, I shall 
detail P1 and P2. In section three, I will explicate P3, which will put us in a position 
to see why C is true, and, thus, why (3) is false. In section four, I will show how 
common inductive standards obscure the explanatory relation between precedent as a 
plausible rule of inference, and common knowledge that this inference rule is used by 
the players. Lastly, in section 5, I will sketch a positive picture describing how 
coordinating agents should think of one another in the relevant situations. Put 
coarsely, predicting other players’ actions using precedent presupposes a form of 
mutual belief suspension about the inductive standard used by one’s co-participants.  
2. Interdependence and double justification 
The games I will be talking about are two-player, conflict-free, pure coordination 
games; i.e. games with multiple strict Nash equilibria35 in which one player’s gain 
does not require the other player’s sacrifice. Such games can be represented by the 
following matrix36: 
                                                 
35 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no individual has an incentive to change her choice given the choices of the 
others. 
36 This matrix should be read as follows: The labels ‘Player I’, and ‘Player II’ represent the players. The labels “X”, and “Y” 
represent the players strategies. The numbers represent the players’ utilities. These utilities are a function of the players’ 
strategies. In this chapter, I will be making use of players’ pure strategies; i.e. a player’s decision to play a strategy with 
probability 1. The expected utility of choosing a particular strategy is the utility associated with this choice given the expected 




  Player 1 





 X 1,1 0,0 
Y 0,0 1,1 
  Figure: 1 
 
In this game, players have to solve the equilibrium selection problem. There are two 
relevant pure37 equilibria, {X,X} and {Y,Y}, and the players have to figure out a way 
to settle on one of them. Ultimately, each player is trying to match what she takes the 
other player to choose, which is why each player’s choice depends only on estimates 
(beliefs, credences, or knowledge) about the other player’s choice. This is all I shall 
say in defense and illustration of the Interdependence premise.  
Let’s move on to the second premise. Beliefs about the other player’s choice can 
be justified in several ways. In this chapter, I will focus on only two sources of 
evidence: Higher-order beliefs and precedent (and, concomitantly, the combination of 
both). Let’s start with precedent as a source of evidence.  
Predicting behavior using precedent means inferring future behavior based on a 
past behavioral regularity. The validity of such reasoning can perhaps be explained by 
the fact that “we may tend to repeat the action that succeeded before if we have no 
strong reason to do otherwise” (Lewis 1969, 36). To see how precedent might do this, 
consider first an example from David Lewis: “I know very well that I have often seen 
                                                 





cars driven in the United States, and almost always they were on the right. [...] Given 
a regularity in past cases, we may reasonably extrapolate it into the (near) future” 
(Lewis 1969, 41). Many (Sillari 2008; Lewis 1969; Sugden 2015; Bicchieri 2006) 
acknowledge that precedent can provide coordinating agents with evidence despite 
the fact that there is no theory with regard to what it is that makes a particular feature 
salient. Past and future actions are never alike in all, but, rather, merely in some 
respects. Reasoning from precedent is therefore dependent on certain salient features 
of actions. This, however, does not detract from the fact that precedent is real; in any 
case, in this chapter I will assume that it is. Lastly, precedent-based reasoning is 
defeasible; it is a mere “last resort [for the players], when they [the players] have no 
stronger ground for choice” (Lewis 1969, 35). This idea was represented above by the 
squiggly arrow. Higher-order beliefs, as I will argue this chapter, turn out to be a 
“stronger ground for choice”. 
Let’s move to higher-order beliefs as a source of evidence. To start seeing how 
higher-order beliefs can guide predictions of the other’s behavior, consider the 
following vignette: 
Fast Food 2. You and I want to meet for lunch. We have two options: 
McDonald’s or Wendy’s. We don’t care where we’ll have lunch as long as 
we’ll have lunch together. 
I learn that a source, who you believe to be infallible, told you that I will go 
to Wendy’s this time around.  




   
 
 
The indexed letter ln indicates the depth of reasoning (e.g. l2 represents a second-order 
belief). Note also that the arrow simply indicates that direction of the nesting of 
beliefs; it does not indicate a rule of inference of any sort. I reason as follows: Since 
you believe that I will go to Wendy’s, you will intend to match my decision. Thus, I 
expect you to go to Wendy’s, which is why the rational decision on my part is to go 
to Wendy’s. My second-order belief about you justifies my first-order belief about 
where you will go. My first-order belief, in turn, settles my decision. 
Such second-order beliefs can, in turn, be justified by a third-order belief as the 





Of course, third-order beliefs can be justified by fourth-order beliefs and so on ad inf. 
Thus, the following general picture emerges: Any level-n belief about a player’s 
choice can be justified, presumably, in various ways. One particular way to justify a 
level-n belief is in terms of a level n + 1 belief. If each belief is indeed justified in this 






I believe that  
you believe that I will be at 
Wendy’s.  
I believe that you will be at 
Wendy’s. 
you believe that 











hierarchy of beliefs marks the crucial characterization (not a definition38) of common 
belief relevant for our purposes. Furthermore, if these beliefs are true, then this 
amounts to a characterization of common knowledge.  
Although discussions of coordination games make frequent reference to common 
knowledge simpliciter that each will choose their part of a particular equilibrium, we 
should instead rely on the slightly amended notion of common reciprocal knowledge 
(and belief) which is gleaned from Robert Sugden (2015). The problem with good old 
common knowledge is its reflexivity; i.e. if p is common knowledge among 
individuals in a population N, then each individual in N knows that p, knows that she 
herself knows, etc. In coordination games such as Fast Food, however, each player is 
just concerned with what she believes the others are going to do, what others take yet 
others do and so on ad inf. As a reminder, this type of reasoning is illustrated in 
Figure 2 and 3. The Sugden-inspired notion of ‘common reciprocal knowledge’ 
captures this idea by taking reflexivity out of the definition. A group of players have 
common reciprocal knowledge (belief) that p is true, if, and only if, for all players i 
and j in N, where i≠j, i knows (believes) that p holds for j; all individuals i, j, and k in 
N, where i≠j and j≠k, i knows (believes) that j knows (believes) that p holds for k, 
and so on ad inf..  
Lastly, we should note that both types of justification can be combined; e.g. third-
                                                 
38 Although common knowledge (belief) can be characterized by an infinite hierarchy of (actual, potential, or dispositional) 
nested higher-order true beliefs, it should be noted that this is really just a characterization; not a definition. Definitions of 
common knowledge have, for instance, been given in terms of public events, or inference patterns between symmetric reasoners 
(for an overview consult Vanderschraaf 2014). These definitions, however, need not concern us, because, although common 
knowledge is not defined in terms of iterated beliefs, it nevertheless entails these iterations. Hence, by contraposition, a failure of 




order predictions can justify second-order beliefs that can, in turn, justify precedent. 






Similarly, we should say that each level n belief can, in principle, be justified with 
regard to a level n+1 belief, or, alternatively, precedent.  
3. Higher-order defeat 
Precedent can justify predictions about the other player’s actions only in the absence 
of any reciprocal belief that would likewise justify or undermine this prediction; this 
is because, as premise three of the above argument states, justifications based on 
higher-order beliefs defeat precedent-based justifications. Let’s add some color and 
precision to this idea.  
Let RBn stand for any such nth level reciprocal belief. Let Precedent stand for a 
piece of precedent-based evidence bearing on this belief. Lastly, let RBn+1 stand for 
the reciprocal belief justifying RBn. To illustrate, consider the following propositions: 
RB1 – I believe that you will go to Wendy’s. 
 l3 
l2 
l1 I believe that you will be at 
Wendy’s, because that’s what 
we’ve always done. 
you believe that 






Precedent – In that past, we have always gone to McDonald’s. 
RB2 – I believe that you believe that I will go to Wendy’s. 
The idea, then, is that RB1 can neither be justified nor undermined by Precedent given 
the presence of RB2. The reason is simple: I expect you to think that I, trying to match 
your choice, will go to Wendy’s. Hence, I expect you to go to Wendy’s, which is why 
I myself ought to go to Wendy’s. Given this distribution of beliefs, it shouldn’t matter 
to me that we’ve always gone to McDonald’s in the past. This doesn’t change even if 
we make explicit the fact that your prediction of what I’m going to do has been based 
on precedent. Consider the following proposition:  
*RB2* – I believe that you believe that I will go to Wendy’s, because I believe 
that: you know that that’s what we’ve always done, and you believe that 
people tend to act in the future as they have in the past. 
Once I know that precedent-based reasoning has led you to a conclusion about where 
I’ll go, I should not use precedent in predicting your behavior. Once again, my 
second-order prediction has defeated precedent as a reason for justifying my first-
order prediction. The fact that I also happen to know how you came to settle on your 
belief does not change that.  
Defeat relations among reasons can be grounded in various ways. For instance, in 
standard cases, more specific information defeats less specific information (e.g. Horty 
2012, 216). To provide just one example, consider the fact that Tweaty is a bird. This 




Penguin which acts as a defeater for the aforementioned inference. Once a reasoner 
knows that Tweaty is a Penguin she is not justified in concluding that Tweaty flies 
even though Tweaty is a bird. One might, thus, wonder whether the defeat relation 
between precedent and higher-order beliefs can be explained in similar ways. I think 
this is not so. Rather, the defeat relation in our case is simply grounded in basic 
assumptions about the structure of the game. In a coordination game, as I’ve 
explained above, each player is trying to match the other’s choice; i.e. each player 
will act on what she believes the other is going to choose. If the structure of the game, 
as well as the players’ rationality, are common knowledge, then each player knows 
that the same holds true for the other player. Each player knows that the other will act 
on her belief about what she thinks the other is going to do, which is why precedent 
has, at this point, been defeated.  
Thus, we can state the intended evidential relations as follows using standard 
Bayesian notation: 
(4) Pr(RBn | Precedent ∧ RBn+1) = P r(RBn | RBn+1) 
Condition (4) captures the idea that precedent cannot raise the probability of a 
prediction given the presence of any higher-order belief that would likewise bear on 
this prediction. The example just stated illustrates that (4) is true. But let’s expand on 
this idea a bit more. Consider a case in which I merely believe that you have some 
pertinent reciprocal belief but that I don’t know which one. In this case, (4) will still 




Fast Food 4. You and I want to meet for lunch. We have two options: 
McDonald’s or Wendy’s. We don’t care where we’ll have lunch as long as 
we’ll have lunch together. 
In the past, we’ve always gone to McDonald’s. I learn that a source, who 
you (perhaps falsely) believe to be infallible, flipped a fair coin, and either 
told you that I would be at Wendy’s this time (if it came up heads), or she 
told you that I would be at McDonald’s (if it came up tails). 
In this case, my rational response is debatable. However, one thing is clear; I should 
not rely on precedent in making my decision. You have a belief about where I’m 
going to be, and you will try to match my decision based on this belief. This is 
conclusive for you and, thus, precedent should not be invoked. This is different from 
the case in which I don’t know whether you have any belief about what I’m going to 
choose. Consider the following case an illustration of this thought:  
Fast Food 5. You and I want to meet for lunch. We have two options: 
McDonald’s or Wendy’s. We don’t care where we’ll have lunch as long as 
we’ll have lunch together. 
In the past, we’ve always gone to McDonald’s. I learn that a source, who 
you (perhaps falsely) believe to be infallible, flipped a fair coin, and either 
told you that I would be at Wendy’s this time (if it came up heads), or she 
didn’t tell you anything at all (if it came up tails). 




The guiding intuition, I think, is that in the case in which she didn’t tell you anything 
at all, you have no belief about what I’m going to do which is why precedent may 
permissibly be invoked.  
These examples show that first-order predictions based on precedent are defeated 
by the presence of a second-order reciprocal belief. Similar examples can easily be 
constructed for each level; i.e. nth-order predictions based on precedent are defeated 
by n+1th order reciprocal beliefs. The common inductive standard requirement (i.e. 
expressed in statement (3)39 from above), however, introduces such a higher-order 
expectation about what the other believes oneself will do, which is why it is 
implausible.  
Now, statement (3) frames the common inductive standard in terms of second-
order knowledge. However, nothing in the analysis changes if we substitute second-
order for common knowledge (as Bicchieri has suggested). After all, if the agents 
have common knowledge about the inductive standard they use, then each level-n 
belief about a player’s choice is accompanied by a defeating level n+1 belief, which 
is why no level-n belief can be justified via precedent.  
The cases discussed in this section present the reader with situations in which both 
types of evidence conflict; cases in which precedent favors one response and higher-
order beliefs favor a different response. In these cases, precedent is defeated. I should 
emphasize, however, that conflict is not required for defeat. To see why reconsider 
Fast Food 4; once I learn that you have a belief about where I will be, I simply don’t 
                                                 




care about precedent anymore; precedent becomes a non-issue. This is independent of 
whether precedent aligns or opposes the conclusions I drew based on higher-order 
reasoning. For the reader who prefers to reserve “defeat” language for conflict cases, 
it may be more accurate – although less common – to say that evidence provided by 
higher-order beliefs “positively screens off” (e.g. Tal and Comesana 2016) precedent-
based evidence. 
4. Explanatory direction 
There is a second objection suggesting that common inductive standards cannot be 
a precondition for reasoning from precedent in coordination games. Suppose for a 
minute that two coordinating agents have common inductive standards; i.e. they 
commonly know that they use precedent as a standard of inference. In this case, we 
may wonder where this piece of common knowledge came from. We may ask “Why 
is it that the players have common knowledge that they use this particular standard, 
and not some other, perhaps more outlandish, one?”. One compelling candidate 
answer is that precedent is simply a good standard to use; i.e. it works as a predictor 
of people’s actions. In short, precedent is not a good behavioral predictor because 
people think that they use it as an inductive standard, but, rather, precedent is a 
common inductive standard, because it is a good predictor.  
Now, if precedent-based inferences were to presuppose such common knowledge, 
then the fact that precedent is simply a good predictor could, on pains of circularity, 
hardly be recruited for such explanatory purposes. In other words, if precedent were a 




commonly know that this is the standard is invoked, then the fact that that precedent 
is simply a good predictor could hardly be invoked in explaining why the agents 
commonly know that this is the standard they invoke. For this reason, predicting 
behavior using precedent should be allowed without presupposing that the agents 
commonly know that it is invoked as a standard of inference.  
A critic might want to argue that the independent appeal of precedent as a 
plausible predictor derives from contexts other than coordination games. In 
coordination games, a player’s action, this critic might say, depends on predictions of 
the other agent’s behavior. In other contexts, however, this is not so. For instance, in 
predicting what wine I’m going to have tonight, you might invoke precedent and 
predict that I will choose red; and since precedent is a good standard of inference to 
use in these non-strategic contexts, it is, one might conjecture, also a good standard in 
the context of coordination games.  
I don’t think that this thought is plausible though. After all, rational agents should 
not be inclined to use a standard of inference in a context in which it is simply not 
suitable. If it were true that reasoning from precedent requires common inductive 
standards when playing a coordination game, it would simply be a mistake to suppose 
that such reasoning has independent appeal (i.e. is a plausible standard of inference 
even without presupposing common inductive standards).  
5. Reasoning from precedent presupposes common belief suspension 
In this chapter, I started with the thought that predicting others’ behavior in a 




straightforward. This simple inference was captured in statement (2)40. In the 
philosophical literature, however, it has been argued that this simple inference ought 
to be enriched by a common inductive standard; i.e. higher-order expectations about 
the other players’ expectations. The guiding thought throughout this chapter was that 
this addition is implausible: predicting an agent’s behavior in a coordination game 
using precedent as a standard of inference is incompatible with such higher-order 
expectations, which is why we should say that precedent-based predictions are 
permissible only in the absence of higher-order beliefs about the players’ choices.  
To see how this would go, let’s go back to Fast Food. When thinking about 
whether you believe that I will go to McDonald’s, I may lack both, the belief that you 
think that I will, and the belief that I won’t go to McDonald’s. In short, I might 
suspend belief about where you think I will go. Belief suspension about a proposition 
P entails, almost everybody agrees, neither believing or disbelieving that P is the case 
(e.g. Bergmann 2005, 420; Wedgwood 2002). Only Jane Friedman has doubts (see 
Friedman 2017). The connection between suspension and not believing, she contends, 
is normative, not descriptive. An agent who is suspended about P ought not believe 
nor disbelieve it; but since we’re operating under the assumption of perfect 
rationality, we can sidestep these subtleties. Of course, simply not believing and 
disbelieving is not sufficient for belief suspension. After all, a person who has never 
even considered a certain proposition is not suspended about it; she simply doesn’t 
entertain this proposition. Belief suspension requires some form of cognitive contact 
                                                 





with the pertinent proposition. It is, as Scott Sturgeon puts it, a state of “committed 
neutrality” (Sturgeon 2010, 90). The exact form of cognitive contact is, of course, 
controversial. It has been said that suspending requires “refraining” (Moore 1979), 
“withholding”, or “resisting” believing. This is obviously not the place to adjudicate 
between these issues; however, I think it is important to keep in mind that an agent 
may consider a proposition and yet neither believe nor disbelieve it.  
Is there a candidate situation in which coordinating agents suspend belief about the 
other’s beliefs concerning one’s own choice, suspend belief about what she beliefs 
oneself beliefs she will do, and so on ad inf..? – a situation in which precedent-based 
predictions go undefeated? I think there is; namely when both agents commonly know 
that they have just started deliberating about what to do. 
To start seeing this, we should note that, at the start of their deliberation, the agents 
haven’t considered any evidence yet, which is why they should suspend belief about 
what the other will do, why she will do it, what the other thinks oneself will do and 
why she thinks oneself will do it, and so on ad inf. In short, at the start of one’s 
deliberation, one has simply not formed any beliefs yet, and one should resist forming 
these beliefs until one has suitably considered the pertinent evidence. There are two 
reasons in support of this thought. First, it seems that if attitude suspension is ever 
appropriate, then this should be when an agent has not considered any evidence. 
Friedman emphatically states that “it is hard to think of evidential circumstances more 
appropriate for suspension” than situations in which an agent has no evidence 




deliberative contexts. This is the position recently defended by Friedman (2017) who 
states: 
 “[W]e can say that there is nothing more to “opening a question in 
thought” than simply suspending judgment on that question. In 
suspending about Q we make Q an object of inquiry. From there we 
can wonder or be curious or deliberate (and so on) about Q. 
Suspending about a question puts that question on our research 
agenda.” (Friedman 2017, 26) 
Deliberating, or “inquiring”, about whether Q is true is most appropriate when we 
haven’t settled on either believing or disbelieving it. Deliberation is, then, the kind of 
activity that aims at resolving this neutral state.  
Suppose that, in deliberating about how the respective other will act, we’re 
initially suspended, because we haven’t considered any evidence, and, as a corollary, 
have not formed any higher-order belief about the other’s choice. Suppose next, that 
we (commonly) know that we’ve just started our deliberative process, and, thus, 
(commonly) know that we are so-suspended. In this case, we don’t have any higher-
order beliefs about where the other thinks oneself will go. I don’t have any belief 
about what you think I will do, and I also know that you don’t have any such belief 
about what I think you will do. In this initial state, there are no higher-order beliefs. 
All potentially defeating higher-order beliefs are absent and we may, at least as far as 
the relevant defeaters go, permissibly predict the respective other’s behavior using 




The following picture emerges: It is epistemically permissible for agents to predict 
each other’s behavior based on precedent only in the absence of higher-order 
reciprocal beliefs about their actions. The latter condition is (for instance) satisfied 
when agents commonly know that they’ve just started deliberating about how to act 
and are thus suspended about what the other thinks oneself will do, what she thinks 
oneself thinks the other will do etc.  
6. Conclusion 
David Lewis wrote that salience (e.g. grounded in precedent) can support 
coordination by providing reasons for choosing a strategy when there is “no stronger 
ground for choice” (Lewis 1969, 35). Higher-order predictions about what the other 
player thinks oneself will choose present, I have argued in this chapter, such a 
“stronger ground for choice”. For this reason, precedent-based predictions are 
legitimate only in the absence of such higher-order behavioral predictions. More 
concretely, I have argued that this absence requirement is satisfied when the agents 
commonly know that they both suspend belief about what the respective other is 
going to do and why she’s going to do it. This claim is directed against a 
philosophical doctrine according to which precedent-based predictions require a 
“common inductive standard”; e.g. higher-order predictions about what the other 
player thinks oneself will choose.  
The idea that common knowledge requirements should, in the context of 
coordination games, by couched in terms of belief absences has rarely been noticed. 




in spelling out common knowledge in coordination games. First, in a discussion 
“mutual” knowledge in communicative contexts, Martin Davies (1987, 717) suggests 
that “the philosophical work which was to be done by the notion of mutual 
knowledge should instead be assigned to a negatively characterized notion: mutual 
absence of doubt.” The second reference is from Richard Moore’s (2013, 492) 
discussion of common knowledge in conventional behavior. He notes that “the extent 
to which common knowledge is necessary for conventional activity will be 
determined by its coordinative role. Such a role might consist in protecting 
participants in a convention from higher-order doubts about the conformity of 
others” (my italics). These somewhat cursory remarks merely hint at the structural 
importance belief-absences have for solving coordination games. In this chapter, I’ve 
tried to elaborate on this idea. Importantly, the present analysis showed that common 
knowledge was not simply an unnecessarily baroque theoretical element, but, rather 
it’s presence was said to act as a defeater for reasoning from precedent in the context 







Appendix A: Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social 
Effects on Social Cognition 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following example of a typical social interaction: 
Ian and Mia. Mia enters a coffee shop and sees her best friend Ian sitting on 
the sofa. Ian doesn’t notice her right away because he is stooped over his 
phone, closely examining the image of a woman on a dating website. Ian 
looks up and sees Mia, who smirks when she sees what he’s been looking 
at. Ian blushes and quickly puts away his phone. ‘It’s not what you think’, 
he says. ‘I’m helping Sarah set up her profile’. Mia chuckles and asks Ian if 
he would like something from the barista. Ian asks for a green tea. On her 
way back from the counter, Mia trips, and spills both of their drinks all 
over her jeans. She looks around, and notices how everybody in the coffee 
shop is staring at her. 
Now, contrast this with the following description of a standard false-belief task 
procedure, which is typical of social cognition research: 
Standard False-Belief Task. Children see a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of 
paper with a backpack and a closet drawn on it. ‘Here’s Scott. Scott wants 
to find his mittens. His mittens might be in his backpack or they might be 
in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his backpack. But Scott thinks 
his mittens are in the closet’. ‘So, where will Scott look for his mittens? In 




mittens really? In his backpack or in the closet?’ (the reality question). To 
be correct the child must answer the target question ‘closet’ and answer the 
reality question ‘backpack’. (Wellman and Liu 2004)  
Real-life social interactions like Ian and Mia are complex. They involve, among 
other things, belief ascriptions, gaze cues, emotional signals, gestures, relationships, 
and social conventions. Despite this complexity, the scientific study of such situations 
tends to rely on simplified, highly artificial paradigms like Standard False-Belief 
Task. Ostensibly, the kind of knowledge being tested in the false-belief task is also 
supposed to be the knowledge that Ian and Mia use in order to successfully navigate 
their social encounter—namely, their theory-of-mind. However, the difference 
between these two vignettes is hard to ignore. Of course, some might argue that for 
all their artificiality, we need tools like the false-belief task if we are ever to begin to 
make sense of how social cognition functions. This is a trade-off inherent to all 
experimental psychology: if we desire scientific rigor, we must sacrifice some 
ecological validity. 
However, there are a number of theorists who think that experimental paradigms in 
social cognition research like Standard False-Belief Task sacrifice far too much (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Schilbach et al. 2013). For 
instance, in this experiment the child is set apart from Scott. There is no possibility 
for the two to interact. There are no reciprocal gaze cues, no emotional signals, no 
gestures, and no relationships. The child is merely a passive observer. In Ian and 




transmit a wide range of social cues, which get interpreted in a context-sensitive 
fashion.  
Interactionists conclude that, as a consequence of experimental oversimplification, 
traditional research on human social cognition has lost sight of the very phenomenon 
it set out to explain. What is needed, they propose, is an ‘interactive turn’ towards 
more ‘second-personal’ methods and theories that acknowledge the dynamic, 
interdependent aspects of ordinary social experiences. More specifically, according to 
interactionists, past research is problematic because it relies heavily upon 
observational experimental paradigms. Real social cognition, however, almost always 
takes place in interactive contexts. As a result, current theoretical and empirical 
paradigms are thought to be ill-suited to study the cognitive processes at work in real-
life social activities.  
One example of this kind of ‘interactionist’ approach to social cognition research 
is the double TV monitor paradigm (Murray and Trevarthen 1985). In this 
experiment, 2-month old infants were shown a TV screen displaying a video of their 
mothers. In the ‘interactive’ condition, the video was live, while in the ‘non-
interactive’ condition, the video showed a replay of their mother’s actions. It was 
found that infants quickly disengaged when presented with the replay video, but were 
far more motivated to attend to the feed in the interactive condition.  
Another example is the perceptual crossing paradigm (Auvray et al. 2009; Auvray 
and Rohde 2012). In this experiment, two players move an avatar along a one-




strip, a player can cross paths with three objects: a static object, the other player’s 
avatar, and the other player’s avatar’s shadow (i.e. an object copying the movements 
of the other player’s avatar). Each agent receives the same sensory feedback upon 
crossing paths with any of these three objects. Importantly, when one player’s avatar 
crosses paths with another player’s shadow only the player with the avatar receives 
feedback. If two players’ avatars meet, both players receive sensory feedback. 
Interestingly, although the sensory feedback a player receives from crossing paths 
with any of the objects is identical, players nevertheless typically manage to ‘find’ 
one another (i.e. oscillate their avatars around each other).  
The interactionist criticism, thus far, amounts to the claim that traditional research 
paradigms such as Standard False-Belief Task need to be supplemented by novel 
interactive paradigms; and this criticism is well-taken. However, some interactionists 
have taken their critique a step further, and argued that the socio-cognitive processes 
at work in interactive contexts are fundamentally distinct from those that operate in 
observational ones. For instance, Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto have argued at 
length that mental state attribution really only occurs in observational scenarios; in 
social interactions, we rely upon a range of non-mentalistic processes, including gaze-
following, social narratives, and emotional mirroring (Gallagher 2001, 2009; Hutto 
2004, 2007; Gallagher and Povinelli 2012).  
At times, interactionists in the enactivist tradition make the even more radical 
claim that social interactions can actually constitute social cognition. Interactions, it is 




individuals. When two autonomous agents act in such a manner that their actions are 
‘coupled’ (i.e. causally interdependent), this can create a higher order ‘dynamical 
system’ with its own intrinsic properties. These systems, it is claimed, are the true 
loci of social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 2010). We should, therefore, abandon the 
idea that social cognition can fully be explained in purely individualistic terms. 
Instead, according to the interactionists, social cognition researchers ought to focus 
their efforts on the intrinsic properties of interactive systems. 
Other proponents of the interactive turn have de-emphasized the claim that social 
interactions are constitutive of social cognition. For instance, Gallotti and Frith have 
argued that interacting agents have ‘novel routes to knowledge of other minds’ that 
facilitate cooperation and team reasoning (Gallotti and Frith 2013, 162). This route to 
social knowledge is achieved by entering into the ‘we-mode’, a psychological state in 
which aspects of an interactive scene are represented via distinctively collective 
mental attitudes: believing-together, intending-together, desiring-together, etc. When 
agents enter the ‘we-mode’, they co-represent the action-possibilities available to 
their interactive partners, and use this information to make decisions that achieve 
collective ends. Andreas Roepstorff and colleagues have also proposed that social 
situations can be interactive to varying degrees; with increasing degrees of 
interactivity, they find corresponding effects upon processing speed (Tylén et al. 
2012), accurate collective decision-making (Bahrami et al. 2012), and physiological 




While proponents of the interactive turn come in various flavors, they all endorse a 
central methodological claim: in order to promote ecological validity, experiments in 
social cognition need to become less observational and more interactive. In this 
chapter, we will argue that this way of thinking is misguided. We are of course in 
favor of improving the ecological validity of social cognition research; however, we 
think that the notion of ‘social interaction’, as it is currently being deployed, is the 
wrong tool for the job. We argue that contrasting social cognition in interactive and 
non-interactive contexts is often uninformative, and prone to methodological 
confusion. This is because both the proximal causes and underlying mechanisms that 
support naturalistic social cognition tend to straddle the interaction/observation 
dichotomy. In short, we believe that emphasizing ‘interaction’ is a red herring. 
To show why this is the case, we will first turn our attention to the definition of 
‘interaction’ that has become the standard in the interactionist literature. We will 
argue that this definition introduces concepts that needlessly complicate the target 
phenomena. In its place, we will offer a pared down, minimalist definition of 
‘interaction’ that adequately captures the phenomena that interactionists are interested 
in. 
Next, we will point out an obstacle to any cognitive scientist wishing to implement 
‘interactionist’ experimental paradigms. This is that interactions are typically 
composed of many different social elements that are not themselves interactive. These 
concomitant social elements create a number of potential confounds for interactionist 




end, we review four bodies of literature that illustrate the need for appropriate, non-
interactive controls in interactionist paradigms: the ‘Social Simon Effect’, 
spontaneous perspective-taking, imitation, and conversational alignment.  
Finally, we will argue that in many cases, so-called ‘interactionist’ paradigms have 
really featured ersatz interactions. We think this shows that it is not interaction as 
such that really makes a difference in social cognition research, but rather that 
individual participants believe themselves to be interacting. This contradicts the basic 
anti-individualist thrust of interactionism.  
2. Defining “interaction” 
We now turn to the issue of defining ‘social interaction’. This turns out to be a 
delicate matter: while it is widely acknowledged that to develop an adequate theory of 
social cognition, we should be studying social interactions, there are ways of defining 
the term that largely presuppose a particular theory of social cognition. But if 
studying social interaction is supposed to provide evidence for these same theories, 
this ends up being circular. What is needed, rather, is a theory-neutral definition of 
social interaction that all interested parties can agree upon. This notion of interaction 
can then serve as a common point of departure for future debates. Therefore, our 
strategy in this section will be to start with the most prominent definition of social 
interaction in the extant literature, and then pare it down to a minimal, theory-neutral 
form. 
The most influential definition of ‘social interaction’ comes from De Jaegher, Di 




De Jaegher Interaction. Two or more autonomous agents co-regulating 
their coupling with the effect that their autonomy is not destroyed and 
their relational dynamics acquire an autonomy of their own. Examples: 
conversations, collaborative work, arguments, collective action, dancing 
and so on. (De Jaegher et al. 2010, 441) 
An ‘autonomous system’ is further defined as a ‘network of co-dependent, precarious 
processes able to sustain itself and define an identity as a self-determined system’ (De 
Jaegher et al. 2010, 441). The set of autonomous systems, on this definition, includes 
most biological life-forms, from single-celled organisms to human beings, and also 
socially constructed entities, like corporations and nations. In the context of social 
cognition, the relevant class of autonomous systems is restricted to autonomous 
agents. ‘Coupling’ occurs when one autonomous system causally impacts the 
functioning of another. Coupling is said to be ‘regulated’ when this causal impact is 
in some way controlled by that system; and it is said to be ‘co-regulated’ when two or 
more autonomous systems are controlling how they causally impact one another. 
Genuine social interactions, on this view, occur when this co-regulated coupling 
results in the creation of a new autonomous system while still preserving the 
autonomy of the co-regulators. Lastly, this emerging interactive system is required to 
be temporally extended enough to take on ‘autonomy’ of its own.   
Our first issue with this definition is related to the idea that genuine social 
interactions take on ‘an autonomy their own’. As noted above, a definition of ‘social 




social ontology. However, the ontology implied by the above phrase is highly 
controversial: namely, that interactions create new autonomous systems. These 
autonomous systems are then thought to form the proper objects of social cognition 
research: they literally constitute social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 2010). But a 
number of authors have argued that this claim amounts to a confusion of constitution 
and causation (Herschbach 2012; Carruthers 2015). Given that this debate is still 
ongoing, it seems unnecessary to hardwire such a controversial metaphysical claim 
into a practical, theory-neutral definition. Therefore, we propose the following first 
initial revision to De Jaegher’s et al.’s definition:  
Interaction - First Revision. Two or more autonomous agents co-
regulating their coupling with the effect that their autonomy is not 
destroyed.  
Our second worry concerns the role that the concept of ‘autonomy’ plays in this 
definition. In De Jaegher and colleagues’ definition, ‘autonomy’ is introduced as a 
technical notion according to which almost all biological life forms, not just human 
beings, can constitute autonomous systems (i.e. they can form self-sustaining and 
self-determining systems). Likewise, interactions between such autonomous systems 
don’t necessarily have to involve human beings either: interactive systems would 
come into being whenever two cells cross paths in a petri dish, and whenever two 
countries engage in diplomatic negotiations. With such a broad scope, one might 
worry that this notion of social interaction is indeed too broad to be of any scientific 




needs to be something that can be operationalized in a controlled, experimental 
setting.  
Presumably, it is for these reasons that De Jaegher and colleagues narrow their 
definition to be specifically about autonomous ‘agents’. However, in this case 
‘autonomy’—at least in the technical sense of the term—does not do any definitional 
work. This is because the set of agents is a proper subset of the set of autonomous 
systems. Therefore, the phrase ‘autonomous agent’ is not more informative than the 
term ‘agent’. 
Furthermore, given their technical notion of autonomy, it is unclear why cases of 
coercion should be discounted, as De Jaegher and colleagues maintain (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo 2007, 495; De Jaegher et al. 2010, 443). In a case of armed robbery, for 
instance, it would seem that we have an instance of correlated mutual behaviour that 
is at least as complex as the case of two people having a conversation. Why, then, 
would this fail to create an interaction? According to De Jaegher and colleagues, the 
coercive nature of the mugger’s actions would ‘destroy the autonomy’ of the victim. 
If the criteria for autonomy are so weak that bacteria in a petri dish can form an 
autonomous system, it is hard to see how it could be destroyed simply by demanding, 
‘Your money or your life!’. Even if the victim complies, it seems as though her status 
as an autonomous system in the sense being used here would be preserved.  
Of course, there is a classic, Kantian sense in which the victim’s autonomy in this 
situation is compromised—namely, her ability to act in accordance with a law of her 




definition, they could avoid the charge of vacuity. However, we would then need to 
dramatically revise the range of cases that would count as social interactions. First, 
the subset of entities that possess autonomy in this strong sense will be much smaller 
than those that possess it in the weaker sense. Young children and animals, for 
instance, are unlikely to be autonomous in this sense. Drug addicts and persons with 
cognitive disabilities would also likely to fall below the threshold. Women in highly 
patriarchal countries with oppressive religious laws would also lack this kind of 
autonomy. Second, although human agents can be autonomous in this sense, it is 
unclear what it would mean for a co-regulated coupling to create an autonomous 
system. In short, it is not clear when—if ever—the conditions for interaction would 
obtain, given this notion of autonomy. Lastly, and most importantly, it is not at all 
clear why an obviously normative notion should play a role in cognitive science. The 
fact that a person cannot act in accordance with the law of her own choosing does not 
obviously bear on the cognitive mechanisms she brings to bear when encountering 
other agents. 
These problems associated with the Kantian notion of autonomy also generalize to 
other normative theories of autonomy, which are generally unfit to constrain 
cognitive theories of interaction. To see this more clearly, consider the higher-order 
theory of autonomy defended by Michael Bratman (Bratman 2003, 2007). According 
to Bratman, autonomous agents treat mere considerations to act as justifying reasons 
to act (2007, 178). Treating one’s considerations in this way functions as a guide to 
resolve indecision and is, therefore, desirable. Autonomy, understood in this way, is a 




higher-order regard for their first-order motivations. Importantly, it is implausible that 
agents who fail to treat their considerations for action as justifying reasons cannot 
engage in mundane (but clear) forms of interaction (e.g. paying the cashier for the 
groceries I wish to buy). In short, normative theories of autonomy introduce 
constraints that are too restrictive to ground cognitive accounts of interaction.  
Thus, De Jaegher and colleagues’ reliance on ‘autonomy’ in their definition faces a 
dilemma: given the original, more technical notion of autonomy, interactions are so 
ubiquitous and variable that they do not form a category of scientific interest. Given a 
more demanding, normative notion of autonomy, interactions become so rare that it is 
not clear whether they occur at all. Interactionists could address this issue by 
providing an alternative account of ‘autonomous systems’ that is situated somewhere 
in between these two extremes. But until such an account is provided, the notion of 
‘autonomy’ is not scientifically useful. Therefore, we propose a second revision to De 
Jaegher’s definition:  
Interaction - Second Revision. Co-regulated coupling between conscious 
human beings.  
This revised definition does away with the notion that interactions must be performed 
by autonomous systems. But nothing serious is lost. We noted that once the relevant 
class of agents is specified, the further classification ‘autonomous agents’ is 
explanatorily inert. The revised definition makes explicit that, in the context of social 
cognition, the relevant class of agents are conscious human beings. To be sure, other 




Lastly, we propose a small addition to our definition: two agents or more co-
regulate their coupling if the actors knowingly41 affect each other’s actions. This 
further specification is necessary to rule out cases in which agents affect each other’s 
actions by mere accident. Consider the case in which you swipe the foliage from your 
lawn into my lawn. I, thinking that a sudden gust of wind is responsible, swipe it back 
into your lawn. You, having the same thought, swipe it back into my lawn. We keep 
doing this until the end of August, when the foliage finally decays. Although we’re 
affecting each other, we are, intuitively, not interacting. Moreover, our behaviour is 
uninteresting from the perspective of social psychology. Lastly, the addition of 
knowingly is preferable to the addition intentionally, because it does not exclude 
cases in which several agents affect each other’s actions by mere foresight42. 
In summary: after a few clarificatory modifications of De Jaegher and colleagues’ 
account of interaction, we are left with the following definition. 
Minimal Social Interaction. When two or more conscious human beings 
mutually and knowingly affect one another’s actions, they are engaged 
in a social interaction. 
This minimalist definition fits nicely with paradigmatic examples of social 
interaction: conversation, dancing, cooking a meal together, playing tennis, etc. It also 
                                                 
41 Note that, for our purposes, knowingly should be given a deflationary reading that is common in psychology (Dienes and 
Perner 1999; Nagel 2013). Knowing X, in this sense, means ‘being aware of X and being sensitive to X when acting’. For 
instance, for Dienes and Perner (1999) mere perceptual awareness is sufficient for knowledge. What is more, having knowledge 
does not require recognizing that one has knowledge; i.e. it does not presuppose the concept KNOWLEDGE. Lastly, interacting 
knowingly does not presuppose the concept of INTERACTION; rather, it merely requires being aware of the constituents of 
interaction (e.g. the other person’s voice and actions).   
42 Think, for instance, of a case in which you merely intend to get the foliage off your lawn, but you also foresee that I’ll be mad 




does not, however, eliminate cases of coercion and manipulation, such as the mugger 
scenario, or even actively violent encounters, such as fistfights. But it is not clear why 
these cases should be eliminated: surely, not all social interactions are pleasant and 
cooperative. While we may morally disapprove of these actions, this does not make 
them any less interactive. 
This minimalist definition also fits nicely with key examples of interactionist 
experiments. In the Double TV-monitor paradigm, for instance, the live-feed 
condition makes it so that infants and their mothers are able to mutually respond to 
one another’s actions; when the recording of the mother’s expressions are played 
back for the child, this is no longer possible. In the perceptual-crossing study, 
participants are able to locate one another’s sensors on the one-dimensional strip 
because they are able to mutually respond to one another, whereas the ‘shadow’ and 
the fixed object cannot. 
According to the minimal approach, paradigms like the standard false-belief task 
would not count as interactive. This is because the actions of the character in the 
vignette do not affect the child’s actions, and the child’s actions do not affect those of 
the character in the vignette. The child merely observes the events taking place in the 
vignette, and then makes a prediction about them. There is no opportunity for a 
reciprocal exchange of information between the child and the character, nor any 
possibility for mutuality. It is decidedly non-interactive. 
With this definition in hand, we are now in a position to defend our main point: if 




frame this effort in terms of a distinction between interactive and observational 
scenarios.  
3. The constituents of interaction 
Proponents of an ‘interactive turn’ in social cognition research claim that in order to 
learn more about the nature of social cognition, we need to create more interactive 
experimental designs, and get away from purely observational paradigms. There is 
nothing wrong with designing interactive paradigms; however, it’s not clear how 
much we really learn when we try to directly compare interactive and non-interactive 
contexts. This is because social interactions typically involve many different elements 
that are not themselves interactive.  
To illustrate, take a prototypical interaction: a conversation with a colleague by the 
drinking fountain. Such an encounter would involve the physical co-presence of two 
individuals; however, this by itself would not make it an interaction. Likewise, the 
two speakers might possess mutual background knowledge about one another, 
including beliefs about each other’s occupation, political views, short- and long-term 
goals, and so on. But this too does not make the encounter an interactive one. The 
conversation also involves the use of language. But even this, all by itself, fails to 
make the context interactive: one could easily imagine a person speaking aloud to 
herself, while another person ignores her. None of these elements, by themselves, it 
seems, are enough to make an encounter interactive. But all the same, they seem to be 




Social interactions like this one seem to be complex events, composed of many 
elements that contribute to its interactive nature, and yet are not themselves 
interactive. All of these elements—physical co-presence, background knowledge, the 
use of language—often co-occur in social interactions, but are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for an interaction to occur. But, as we shall see in this section, they still 
have considerable effects on social cognition. As such, it is unclear whether 
‘interactive’ effects on social cognition are driven by interaction as such, or by one of 
its component elements. In this section, we use several distinct bodies of evidence to 
argue that simply contrasting interactive and non-interactive scenarios is not 
informative. This, we claim, reveals a key oversight in the interactionist approach. 
3.1. The Social Simon Effect (Sebanz et al. 2003)  
In a typical ‘Simon’ task, subjects carry out responses using their left and right hands 
to stimuli appearing on the left and right sides of a screen; typically, subjects are 
faster to respond to stimuli appearing on the side congruent with the response (i.e. left 
side of the screen with left hand response), and slower to respond to items appearing 
on the incongruent side (i.e. left side of the screen with right hand response) (Craft 
and Simon 1970). Natalie Sebanz and colleagues modified this task so that it involved 
two subjects participating in parallel to one another, each responsible for responding 
with either the left or right hand; thus, subjects only had to respond in a Go/No-Go 
fashion depending on what they saw on the screen, regardless of which side the 
stimuli appeared on (Sebanz et al. 2003). Importantly, their performance in no way 




their own screen and respond accordingly. Thus, there was nothing interactive about 
the task. 
When subjects performed this task alone in a control condition, there was no 
spatial congruency effect—they were equally quick to respond to items on either side 
of the screen. But in the social condition, there was a spatial congruency effect: 
subjects were slower to respond to items on the side opposite their response hand (and 
on the same side as the other participant’s response hand). In effect, the presence of 
another agent altered the way they represented their environment, such that it 
included both their own action affordances, and those of the other agent. Even when 
seated side-by-side with another agent completing totally independent tasks, their 
sheer presence affects how we represent and respond to the environment. 
Since Sebanz and colleagues discovered the Social Simon Effect, a number of 
other experiments using similar paradigms have replicated and extended this finding. 
Using variants of the Social Simon paradigm, Guagnano and colleagues found that 
the Social Simon Effect dissipated with increased spatial separation between the two 
agents (i.e. within or beyond arm’s length) (Guagnano et al. 2010); Vlainic and 
colleagues found that the effect persisted even when subjects had no online perceptual 
feedback from the other participant, demonstrating that simply knowing that another 
agent is completing a similar task is enough to alter how one represents one’s own 




another agent was co-present but inactive, or co-present but completing a task of 
which the subject was ignorant, the effect dissipates (Freundlieb et al. 2015).43  
Thus, simply knowing that another agent is acting nearby is enough to alter the 
way that we respond to our environment, even when no interaction—even in the 
minimal sense—is taking place. Given that most interactive experimental designs 
include the co-presence of active agents, it may be that co-presence effects—which 
are not, in fact, the products of interaction—also occur in those tasks. This creates a 
methodological confound for proponents of the ‘interactive turn’ in experimental 
design: how are we to know whether purported interaction effects are genuine, or 
simply the product of the co-presence of other active agents?  
3.2. Level-2 perspective taking 
Physical co-presence also seems to have an effect upon whether or not we 
spontaneously engage in certain forms of perspective-taking, the representation of 
what another agent can see. Psychologists typically distinguish between two ‘levels’ 
of perspective-taking (Masangkay et al. 1974; Flavell et al. 1981): Level-1 
perspective-taking means representing whether or not a particular object is in the 
visual field of an agent, and is sensitive to external, environmental factors like line-
of-sight and occlusion (Michelon and Zacks 2006). Level-2 perspective-taking further 
involves the ability to represent how an object appears to another agent; for instance, 
the numeral ‘6’ might, from one angle, appear to represent the number six, and from 
                                                 
43 Guagnano et al. (2010) interpret their results as showing that the Social Simon Effect is due to participants representing their 
own action space, not the action affordances of those around them. But this claim in undermined by the results of Vlainic et al. 
(2010) and Freundlieb et al. (2015), which show that knowledge of another agent’s action is key to generating the spatial 




another angle, appear to represent the number nine; sensitivity to these differences 
requires an understanding of the aspectual nature of perception (Surtees et al. 2012, 
2016). Until recently, our best evidence suggested that while Level-1 perspective-
taking is automatic and effortless, Level-2 perspective-taking is effortful and requires 
top-down, intentional control (Qureshi et al. 2010; Samson et al. 2010; Surtees et al. 
2012). However, the relevant perspective being taken in these tasks was always that 
of a non-descript, computer generated avatar. But when the avatar is replaced with a 
live agent, we see a very different effect (Elekes et al. 2016).  
In this experiment, subjects sat in front of a monitor lying flat in front of them, and 
had to verify whether or not the numeral on the screen matched a number they heard 
in an audio recording. In the Individual condition, subjects completed this task alone; 
in the Joint condition, subjects sat opposite another participant who was either also 
completing a number-verification task (i.e. the perspective-dependent task), or a 
different task in which they had to say whether the colour of the numeral on the 
screen was the same as one they’d seen just previously (i.e. the perspective-
independent task). Participants in the joint condition always knew which task the 
person opposite them was completing. Importantly, all subjects had to do was 
complete their own task—the actions of the other agent were always irrelevant. Thus, 
the task was not interactive (given our definition). 
Elekes and colleagues found that subjects in the Joint condition were slower and 
made more errors than in the Individual condition, but only when both completed the 




differed on the basis of perspective (i.e. 2, 5, 6 and 9); for numerals whose values 
appeared to be the same regardless of which side of the table the participant was at 
(i.e. 0 and 8), there was no difference between the Individual and Joint conditions. In 
effect, subjects were only slower when 1) they had a live partner, 2) they believed 
that their partner had a similar goal, and 3) the partner’s response would diverge from 
their own on the basis of their Level-2 perspective. In other words, when subjects 
knew that the person across the table from them was viewing the numeral on the 
screen as a number, they spontaneously maintained a representation of what he or she 
saw, and this representation then interfered with their own performance. 
Thus, in this task, the mere co-presence of an active agent was not sufficient to 
prompt Level-2 perspective-taking, but the combination of co-presence and the 
knowledge that this agent had a goal similar to their own did. These results 
complement those of the Social Simon Task: when another agent is co-present, active, 
and has a goal similar to our own, we spontaneously represent both how the 
environment appears to them, and the kinds of actions that are available to them in 
that environment. 
In interactive scenarios, of course, we are usually aware of the physical presence 
of other agents and their goals. Thus, we might expect that in those scenarios, we 
would also represent the affordances of the environment differently, or spontaneously 
adopt our partner’s visual perspective. Upon observing all of these levels of socio-
cognitive processing layered on top of one another, it is tempting to hypothesize that 




However, many of the constituents of this interaction are indeed isolable, and we can 
study the effects of these constituents individually. Moreover, we know that these 
social effects on social cognition are not inherently interactive, because we can also 
observe them in non-interactive scenarios. This is, we think, the central problem with 
the ‘interactive turn’: by focusing on interaction as a global property of social-
cognitive scenarios, we miss out on a wealth of local, fine-grained information that 
may be present in non-interactive contexts. 
A proponent of the ‘interactive turn’ could object that the cases we’ve described 
here are in fact best understood as effects of ‘we-mode’ cognition (Gallotti and Frith 
2013). For even though subjects in the Social Simon tasks and the perspective-taking 
task are not yet engaging in an interaction, they may be cognitively preparing for an 
interaction. The sheer proximity of their partners and the similarity of their tasks, the 
interactionist might argue, creates the sense that they are about to interact with one 
another, and this leads them to become more sensitive to their partner’s perspective 
and action possibilities. Alternatively, these contexts might be said to create the 
illusion of interaction, where in fact there is none. Either way, the objection might go, 
these effects really only make sense in an interactionist framework.  
We think that this objection makes an important point, but also a crucial 
concession. It may well be true that the cognitive processing that takes place in these 
near-interactive contexts have the function of supporting interaction. However, the 
fact remains that their presence was revealed in a non-interactive context, and that 




was a crucial part of discovering these processes. Thus, even if interaction might be a 
part of the explanation of why these effects are present, it was crucial that interaction 
was not a part of the task that revealed them. 
In sum, it is important to identify the various sub-components of interaction, and 
not to mistake the effects of these sub-components for effects of the interaction itself. 
In practice, this will mean employing experimental paradigms that are explicitly non-
interactive.  
3.3. Interaction effects on infant learning 
One line of research that seems to emphasize the importance of interactive methods is 
the literature on ‘natural pedagogy’ (Gergely and Csibra 2005; Csibra and Gergely 
2006, 2009b). According to this view, when an infant is addressed with certain 
ostensive signals (e.g. eyebrow-raising, eye contact, infant-directed speech), children 
spontaneously adopt a specialized learning stance. This learning stance prepares 
children to attend to certain kinds of information, such as facts about the identity and 
category-membership (Csibra and Gergely 2009a). The pedagogical stance is also 
said to facilitate imitative learning.  
The natural pedagogy hypothesis is not an explicitly interactionist proposal. 
However, it does seem to buy into the central methodological prescription of 
interactionism: there are certain forms of cognition that can only be studied in 
interactive contexts. Experiments in this tradition also frequently use observational 
controls to demonstrate the effects of pedagogical learning. For example, Yoon and 




of an object in a non-interactive context, but instead encoded information about the 
object’s identity in an interactive context with pedagogical cues (i.e. where an 
experimenter engaged in infant-directed speech and eye-contact) (Yoon et al. 2008). 
The authors suggest that this is because interactive, pedagogical contexts prompt 
children to pay special attention to generic information. Likewise, in a study with 14- 
to 16-month-olds, Brugger and colleagues found that infants were more likely to 
imitate novel actions more in interactive, pedagogical contexts than in observational 
contexts (Brugger et al. 2007). Based on these contrastive observational-versus-
interactive designs, proponents of the natural pedagogy hypothesis argue that 
pedagogical interactions trigger specialized learning mechanisms that are not active in 
observational contexts. 
The natural pedagogy hypothesis, however, remains controversial if cast as a 
theory specifically about interaction. To see why, note that in Brugger et al. (2007) 
and Yoon et al. (2008), the non-interactive condition was both non-communicative 
(i.e. the action was demonstrated by a solitary person) and observational (i.e. the child 
was not addressed through ostensive cues). Communicative contexts, however, are 
not necessarily interactive: one can observe communication between third parties 
without actively participating in it. Hence, these experiments leave open the 
possibility that the same learning effects attributed to pedagogical interactions might 
also occur in observational but communicative contexts. 
Once the relevant distinctions are introduced, the importance of interaction in 




conducted a study in which 18-month-olds and 24-month-olds imitated novel actions 
(e.g. ringing a doorbell using one’s forehead) in (a) an interactive condition in which 
the experimenter addressed the infant using typical ostensive cues, (b) an 
observational and non-communicative condition in which the infant watched the 
experimenter perform the novel action all by herself, and (c) an observational-
communicative condition, in which the infant watched the experimenter perform the 
novel actions while demonstrating them to another person. They found that 18-month-
olds imitated more in the interactive condition than in the observational–non-
communicative condition, but not significantly more than in the observational–
communicative condition. In other words, it was the communicative dimension of the 
interactive condition that seemed to have improved imitation, rather than interaction 
as such. In 24-month-olds, meanwhile, there were no differences across all three 
conditions.44  
Shimpi and colleagues achieved a similar result while also manipulating the child’s 
familiarity with the imitative model (e.g. whether the model was a family member, a 
complete stranger, or a stranger with whom the child had briefly interacted45 before 
the task began) (Shimpi et al. 2013). Interestingly, children in the observational-
communicative condition imitated consistently regardless of whether they were 
familiar with the model; in contrast, children in the interactive condition imitated far 
less with unfamiliar models than familiar models. Thus, while children were quite 
                                                 
44 Interestingly, emulation was significantly higher in the solitary–non-communicative condition than in the interactive 
condition. (An actor’s action is said to be emulated by an agent, if the actor’s goal is copied by the action. An action is said to be 
imitated, if the agent copies the actor’s exact action sequence.) 





adept at learning imitate complete strangers in observational–communicative 
contexts, some familiarity with the model was a prerequisite for imitative learning in 
interactive contexts.  
On the one hand, these experiments do suggest that interaction can facilitate 
imitative learning in infants. However, these effects are not particularly pronounced: 
in Matheson et al. (2013) imitative learning in the older children was the same for all 
three conditions; in Shimpi et al. (2013) observational learning in communicative 
contexts was robust; and interactive learning was crucially dependent on the 
familiarity of the actor. The importance of interaction in imitative learning thus 
appears to be overstated. Similar observational-communicative controls have yet to 
be carried out for other forms of learning described by the natural pedagogy 
hypothesis (e.g. generic learning), and we cannot say for certain whether 
observational learning will be equally robust in that domain. However, we think there 
is good reason to find out. 
3.4. Conversational alignment 
We’ve noted that there are several social factors that are present in many social 
interactions, that have noticeable effects on social cognition, and that might be 
mistaken for interaction effects, but which are in fact non-interactive. However, an 
interactionist might object, even if these factors are present in non-interactive 
scenarios, they may still have unique effects in the context of a social interaction. 
Take, for instance, our paradigmatic example of a social interaction: conversation. 




interactionist might insist, language works much differently when studied as 
monologue than when it is studied as dialogue. 
This is the central point behind the ‘interactive alignment’ research program of 
Martin Pickering and Simon Garrod, which has focused on the nature of speech 
production and comprehension during naturalistic dialogues (Garrod and Pickering 
2004, 2009; Pickering and Garrod 2004, 2013). Explicit in this research program is a 
critique of psycholinguistic theories based on the study of comprehension and 
production of speech in non-interactive contexts (i.e. monologue). The most natural 
and basic form of language use, they claim, is dialogue; to develop a full 
understanding of the mechanisms of language, we need to study it in this form.  
Central to Pickering and Garrod’s positive account is the observation that speakers 
in a dialogue will tend to converge upon matching representations at the lexical, 
semantic, and syntactic levels—a phenomenon the authors call ‘conversational 
alignment’. For instance, syntactic alignment refers to the spontaneous tendency of a 
speaker to use a particular syntactic construction when that same construction has just 
been used by an interlocutor (e.g. the cowboy gives the pirate a banana versus the 
pirate gives the banana to the pirate (Pickering and Branigan 1999; Branigan et al. 
2000, 2007). In dialogue, this alignment of representations is said to take place at 
multiple levels simultaneously, with alignment at one level facilitating alignment at 
other levels through the co-activation of multi-level associative networks. As a result 
of this alignment process, participants in a dialogue achieve a high level of 




other’s utterances, even when these utterances are otherwise fragmentary, 
overlapping, and entirely ungrammatical. Other researchers have also extended the 
study of alignment in dialogue beyond the coordination of linguistic representations, 
and found evidence for analogous forms of synchronization in eye movements (Dale 
et al. 2011) and heart-rate (Fusaroli et al. 2016). 
We agree with the general project of studying dialogue in naturalistic 
circumstances. However, we argue that much of Pickering and Garrod’s own account 
of the mechanisms supporting conversational alignment depends upon evidence from 
individualistic paradigms. Moreover, while there are some differences in the 
magnitude of the relevant effects when these are measured in interactive contexts, 
these differences are readily explained in terms of other non-interactive mechanisms, 
such as increased attention. Finally, even where we do find uniquely interactive 
alignment effects, individualistic mechanisms still play an important role in their 
explanation. 
For instance, Garrod and Pickering have suggested that alignment between 
speakers and listeners is a product of representational processes that are shared 
between the comprehension and production systems. Thus, when a listener hears an 
utterance of a sentence with a certain syntactic form or lexical item, those 
representations are primed for use in speech production. However, much of the 
evidence that Pickering and Garrod present for this mechanistic hypothesis is derived 
from non-interactive tasks (i.e. ‘monologue’). For instance, the ‘structural 




been established in numerous individualistic experimental paradigms, which 
Pickering and Garrod cite as evidence (Bock 1986; Bock et al. 2007). Pickering and 
Garrod (2013) also suggest that the shared representational processes in 
comprehension and production are the product of forward modelling mechanisms for 
action-planning (Davidson and Wolpert 2004; Tourville et al. 2008) that have been 
repurposed for the covert imitation and prediction of observed actions (i.e. mirror 
neurons (Gallese et al. 1996; Umiltà et al. 2001). But again, the evidence for such 
mechanisms is drawn from paradigms that are entirely individualistic (Watkins et al. 
2003; Pulvermüller et al. 2006; Ito et al. 2009; Möttönen and Watkins 2009; Adank 
and Devlin 2010). Far from being irrelevant to our understanding of language, it 
seems that our understanding of interaction effects in language actually depends upon 
evidence gathered in non-interactive paradigms. 
While the mechanisms underlying various alignment phenomena are present in 
non-interactive contexts, the case could be made that these mechanisms behave 
differently in social interactions. Branigan and colleagues (2007), for example, 
developed an interactive paradigm in which they were able to compare the rates of 
syntactic priming in participants in a conversational interaction with those in 
individuals who were merely side-participants. While they found syntactic priming 
effects in both groups, these effects were significantly stronger when a speaker had 
just been addressed than when he or she was merely listening to other individuals 
speak; but, as Branigan and colleagues themselves note, this effect is likely due to the 
fact that current addressee’s were attending to the speaker more carefully than side-




This suggests that while alignment does increase in the context of conversational 
interactions, alignment is nevertheless explained by a host of mechanisms that do not 
operate only in interactive contexts. 
There are some aspects of conversational alignment that are, in fact, uniquely 
interactive. For instance, Garrod and Pickering (2009) describe how participants in a 
dialogue also coordinate upon the timing of their utterances, which tends to yield 
fairly precise patterns of turn-taking (Ten Bosch et al. 2004; Levinson 2016). This 
phenomenon truly has no non-interactive equivalent, since turn-taking is by definition 
impossible in a monologue. We happily concede that this might be a case where an 
interactive context is necessary to truly grasp the nature of the phenomenon. 
However, Garrod and Pickering’s explanation for our capacity for precise turn-taking 
in conversation invokes precisely the same covert imitation and priming mechanisms 
that explain other aspects of alignment. Thus, even if our knowledge of this 
phenomenon depends upon interactive experimental designs, we owe our 
understanding of it to individualistic research. 
Thus, while dialogue is often cited as a paradigm case of an irreducibly interactive 
process, we would argue that conversational alignment arises from mechanisms that 
are not inherently interactive. In some cases, we do see these mechanisms operating 
differently in the context of interaction. In the case of turn-taking, we seem to have an 
instance of a genuine interaction effect. But other properties of dialogue, such as 
syntactic alignment, are also present in monologue; indeed, our very understanding of 




4. How much does ‘real’ interaction matter? 
It is sometimes suggested that interaction dynamics cannot be explained if we only 
look at the sum of the interactors’ individual contributions to the encounter.46 We 
don’t wish to take a final stand on these issues in this chapter. In this section, we’d 
simply like to point out that most of the interactionists’ own experiments seem to 
tacitly presuppose an individualist framework.  
In a series of experiments, Schilbach and colleagues have investigated interaction-
specific neural activation patterns of action-control (Schilbach et al. 2011), joint 
attention (Schilbach et al. 2010), and mutual gaze (Schilbach et al. 2006). In most of 
these experiments a subject is placed in an fMRI scanner engaging in some kind of 
interaction with a virtual character. Roughly, these experiments indicate that cues 
associated with interaction such as self-directed gaze are associated with differential 
neural activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, which is a region thought to be 
crucially implicated in social cognition (Van Overwalle 2009). For instance, 
Schilbach finds differentially increased neural activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex for (a.) direct (vs. other-directed) gaze (Schilbach et al. 2006), and for 
following (vs. leading) someone’s gaze (Schilbach et al. 2010). To account for the 
interactive element, all participants are made to believe that the virtual character is 
controlled by a real person with whom the interaction will subsequently take place. 
This belief, however, was false: the virtual character was entirely preprogrammed to 
                                                 
46 For instance, De Jaegher et al. argue that ‘interactive processes [...] complement and even replace individual mechanisms’ (De 
Jaegher et al. 2010, 441). At the heart of this proposal is the idea that partitioning social cognitive processes into the cognitive 
mechanisms implemented by individual brains is unwarranted. Rather, it is the interaction between brains that should be 




establish conditions of a controlled experiment. As a result, participants are not 
actually interacting. In terms of experimental design, this is fine; but what these 
experiments tacitly presuppose is that a subject’s individual representation of a 
situation as interactive is sufficient to gain crucial insights in the cognitive 
significance of interaction.  
One notable exception departing from the virtual-character paradigm is a study 
conducted by Cavallo and colleagues (2015). In this study, subjects established eye 
contact with a collaborator who was situated behind the fMRI scanner. The 
collaborator was visible to the participant via a mirror placed inside the scanner. In 
the experiment, either both subjects looked at each other (i.e. mutual gaze) or one of 
them looked away (i.e. averted gaze). In the control conditions participants either 
looked at their own eyes in a mirror reflection, or they looked at an image of the 
collaborator. Cavallo and colleagues found that mutual gaze differentially activates 
the anterior portions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC).  
As indicated above, Schilbach and colleagues found similar patterns of activation, 
even though they relied upon paradigms that used virtual characters (Schilbach et al. 
2006b, 2010b). Comparing these experiments, it seems that real interaction does not 
seem to have made a crucial difference to activation in the mPFC, which was the 
main finding in the mutual gaze condition. Furthermore, Cavallo and colleagues 
found that neural activation was independent of whether subjects actually established 
eye contact or whether subjects merely knew that the collaborator was looking at 




accounted for the distinct pattern of neural activation; actual interaction seemed 
irrelevant. Importantly, while experiments by Schilbach et al. support the idea that 
even simulated interaction leads to activation in the mPFC, the study by Cavallo et al. 
provides direct comparative evidence for the claim that real interaction is not crucial 
for the relevant neural activation patterns to occur. Lastly, while Schilbach also 
reports increased activity in the amygdala, Cavallo finds no such activity.47 And even 
if differential activation in the amygdala were to indicate a difference between virtual 
and real interactions, the absence of such activity in a real interactive conditions is 
rather bad news for the interactionists, who have pointed out that emotional 
engagement is a crucial cognitive element in social interactions (Reddy 2008; 
Schilbach et al. 2013). 
Together these observations suggest that, at least in gaze paradigms, it is more 
significant whether a subject believes that she engaged in an interaction; and not so 
much whether she is actually engaged in an interaction.  
5. Conclusion 
Our aim in this chapter has been to draw attention to the various conceptual and 
methodological confusions that arise when we over-emphasize the notion of 
interaction in social cognition research. First, we argued that De Jaegher and 
colleagues’ prominent definition of interaction diverged significantly from the 
intuitive consensus, and also seems to equivocate on the notion of autonomy. Second, 
                                                 
47 Notably, involvement of the amygdala has been inconsistent throughout an array of studies investigating mutual gaze. For 
instance, while a number of authors (Kawashima et al. 1999; Wicker et al. 2003; Sato et al. 2004; Schilbach et al. 2006) have 




we illustrated how interactive paradigms potentially confound genuine interaction 
effects with the effects of factors that merely co-occur with interaction. Finally, we 
showed that genuine interactions are not needed to study the effects of interaction on 
cognition: the mere representation of interactivity will often do just as well. Genuine 
interactivity, although often the distal cause of such representations, do not play a 
special role in explaining these effects.  
However, our goal in this chapter is not completely negative, and we are not 
wholly opposed to interactive experimental designs; rather, we advocate for a 
complementary, multi-method approach that includes both interactive and non-
interactive methods. However, when interactive designs are used, we advise that 
researchers remain cautious in their interpretations, and that they implement 
appropriate controls before attributing the effects they discover to interaction as such. 
We hope that by drawing attention to the various confounds and confusions that arise 
in interactive experimental designs, we have clarified the significance of interaction 
in social cognition research. With this added clarity, we hope, researchers will now be 
better positioned to pursue the goal of making experimental paradigms in social 
cognition research more ecologically valid. With this end in mind, we have three 
general suggestions for future research: 
1. Interaction is complicated, but defining it doesn’t have to be: While the 
philosophical debate surrounding the ontology of social interaction is still 
ongoing, this debate need not impinge upon practical applications of the 




particular, serves merely to obscure, rather than to clarify, the meaning of 
‘social interaction’. In lieu of the one provided by De Jaegher and 
colleagues, we have offered our own definition that captures the intuitive 
notion of social interaction with minimal conceptual baggage. 
2. Interaction effects versus social effects on social cognition: Ordinary social 
interactions are complex events, which tend to involve a cluster of social 
elements that are not themselves interactive. This makes it difficult to study 
the effects of interaction as such, because we must distinguish the effects of 
interaction from concomitant social factors. Researchers interested in 
improving upon the ecological validity of social cognition paradigms must 
recognize these factors could potentially dissociate from interaction, and 
ought to be investigated in their own right. 
3. Real versus represented interaction: Many of the purported effects of 
interaction on social cognition can also be found in pseudo-interactive 
paradigms. This shows that paradigms manipulating beliefs about 
interaction can be just as informative as the paradigms that involve genuine 
interaction. Once this individualist insight into the ‘interactionist turn’ is 
taken on board, it opens up practical possibilities for social cognition 
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